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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 40

FALL 1987

NUMBER 3

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER
THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT: JUDICIAL
POWER TO PROTECT EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
TODD BROWER*

Introduction
In 1978, Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA),' a com-2
prehensive revision of the laws regarding federal government employees.
Title VII of the CSRA3 consisted of the first statutory framework for federal
labor relations," which prior to that time had been completely governed by a
system started by an executive order issued by President Kennedy in 1962.1
The findings and purposes of the new Act indicate the essential tensions involved in federal labor relations. Section 7101(a) declares that "[labor
organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public in©
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1. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111-1227, as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 2168 (1980); Pub. L. No. 98-224, 98 Stat. 47 (1984) (codified in

various sections of titles 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 38, 39, and 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985))
[hereinafter CSRA].
2. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 91 (1983).
3. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1982).
4. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 91.
5. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963). The executive order scheme was
revised and continued by Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970) and amended by
Exec. Order Nos. 11,616, 11,636, 11,838, 3 C.F.R. 605, 634, 957 (1971-1975). Federal employees
have a long, if spotty, history of unionism. E.g., 1889, establishment of the National Association of Letter Carriers; 1904, formation of the International Association of Machinists, District
No. 44 for federal employee members; 1917, formation of the National Federation of Federal
Employees; 1931, establishment of the American Federation of Government Employees. See
U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 1-2 (1975). See
generally U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE FROM 1789 TO THE
PRESENT 88-89 (1941). Further, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555
(1912) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982)), granted postal employees (and thus all
federal workers) the right to form and join labor organizations.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987

362

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:361

terest," 6 and Title VII consciously strengthens the role of public employee
labor unions. 7 However, the Act also seeks to preserve traditional federal
employer prerogatives in the interest of maintaining "an effective and efficient Government." 8 The dichotomy between unionization and management
efficiency is evident in the structure of the CSRA as well. The model for Title
VII was clearly the National Labor Relations Act, 9 and one goal of the

CSRA was to make federal labor management relations more closely approximate private labor law.'" Nevertheless, the extent and wisdom of this
parallelism was hotly debated by members of Congress," commentators, 2
and courts. "I
Recently, this conflict has erupted on a new front: whether the duty of fair
representation, so firmly entrenched in private labor relations, is present in
6. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1982).
7. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 92.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (1982).
9. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) [hereinafter
NLRA]; Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959); Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended in 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982)).
10. E.g., Columbia Power Trades v. United States Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325, 326 (9th
Cir. 1982) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprintedin COMM. ON POST OF.
FICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM Acr OF 1978, at

678-79 (1979) [hereinafter I LEG. HIST.]); Naylor v. AFGE Local 446, 580 F. Supp. 137, 139
(W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 850, (1984). Accord,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 464 U.S. at 92-93, 103, 107; Message of President
Carter on Civil Service Reform, Mar. 2, 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra, at 102; Aaron, Unfair LaborPracticesand the Right to Strike in the PublicSector: Has the National Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model?, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (1986).
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 404-05 (views of Reps. Rousselot, Collins, Derwinski, Lott, and Taylor); 124 CONG. REC. S14281 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. Sasser); id. at H8462 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall); id. at H8467-68
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay); id. at H9640 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Collins); id. at H9655 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Rousselot);
id. at H9367-68 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay).
12. Public employee labor law has produced a sizeable body of commentary often sharply
divided on ideological grounds. R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1974); Cohen, Does Public Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy?, 32
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 189 (1979); Summers, PublicSector Collective BargainingSubstantially DiminishesDemocracy, 1 GOV'T UNION REV. 5-6 (1980); Summers, Public Employee Bargain-

ing: A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). However, few articles
discuss federal labor relations policy. McCabe, Problems in Federal Sector Labor Management
Relations Under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, INDUS. REL. RESEARCH ASS'N

PROC. 560-65; Masters, FederalEmployee Unions and PoliticalAction, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 612 (1985). One commentator has even suggested that this lack of interest in federal sector
labor relations is due to the federal government's policy being closely allied to the Wellington-

Winter model. Mas.ters, supra, at 613. See also Developments in the Law: Public Employment,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1611 (1980) [hereinafter Developments]; Fox, PATCO and the Courts:Public
Sector Labor Law as Ideology, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 245, 266-67 (1985).
13. E.g., Pham v. AFGE, Local 916, 799 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1986); Turgeon v. FLRA, 677
F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Martel v. Carroll, 562 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mass. 1983); Yates v. United
States Soldiers' & Airmen's Home, 533 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1982).
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the federal public sector. This issue is a direct corollary to the increased role
employee unions play in the federal sector under the Civil Service Reform
Act. It illustrates the tension inherent in a statutory scheme that approaches

the private National Labor Relations Act model, yet contains certain important caveats and omissions.
In the private sector, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he duty of fair
representation has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct
against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions
of federal labor law.""' Thus, while statutorily required to act as the exclusive bargaining representative for a group of employees,'" the union has a
concurrent obligation to deal fairly with all bargaining unit employees, union

members and nonunion members alike.

6

Similarly, the Civil Service Reform Act grants exclusive representative

status to federal employee labor organizations.' 7 Along with that status is the
statutory responsibility for "representing the interests of all employees in the

unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor

14. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
15. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
16. Vaca, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); International Union of United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local
141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 697, 223
N.L.R.B. 832 (1976). For an examination of duty-of-fair-representation jurisprudence, see M.
SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966); THE DUTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION (J. McKelvey ed. 1977); Aaron, The Union'sDuty of FairRepresentation

Under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J.AIR L. CoM. 167 (1968);
Blumrosen, Duty of Fair Representation, 15 LAB. L.J. 598 (1964); Cox, The Duty of Fair

Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Flynn & Higgins, FairRepresentation:A Survey of
the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1096 (1974); Goldberg, The Duty of FairRepresentation: What the Courts
Do In Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89 (1985); Gould, The Negro Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargaining,34 FORDHAm L. REV. 207 (1965); Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and the
Duty of FairRepresentation, 14 LAB L.J. 1052 (1963); Lewis, FairRepresentation in Grievance
Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Molinar, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination,7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 601 (1966); Murphy, The Duty of

Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1965); Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in
Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1964); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy and

Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958);
Wolk, The Decline of Individual Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 266 (1965); Wyle, LaborArbitrationand
the Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 783 (1966); Symposium,
51 Tax. L. REV. 1037 (1973); Note, Labor Law-National Labor Relations Act- Violation of
the Duty of Fair Representation is an Unfair Labor Practice, 78 HARV. L. REV. 679 (1965);
Note, The Duty of FairRepresentationand Exclusive Representation in GrievanceAdministration, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199 (1976); Note, Labor Law-National Labor Relations ActUnion's Duty of Fair Representation Not Implicit in Section VII-Discrimination Based on
Other Than UnionMembership Not a Violation of Section 8(a)(3), 18 VAND. L. REV.268 (1964);
Comment, Labor Law-Duty of Fair Representation-NLRA Section 8(b)(1)(A), 45 B.U.L.
REV. 141 (1965); Comment, Applicability of LMRDA Section 101(a)(5) to Union Interference
with Employment Opportunities, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 700 (1966).
17. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7111(a) (1982).
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organization membership."'" Whether this duty may be enforced by the
federal courts, as it is in the private sector, is the specific focus of this
article. 19
During late August of 1986, in Pham v. AFGE, Local 916,0 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that there existed a federal duty of fair
representation directly cognizable in the federal courts. That decision directly
conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Warren v. Local 1759,
AFGE,2 ' handed down scarcely one year earlier. The controversy in Pham,
Warren, and related cases revolves around two analytically distinct, although
closely related, issues.
The first issue is the propriety of federal subject matter jurisdiction. This
issue stems from the absence in the Civil Service Reform Act" of an
analogue to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 23 That section gives the federal courts the power to hear suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization"' and is often the
jurisdictional basis for private duty-of-fair-representation suits.
The second issue is the preemptive effect of the comprehensive labor relations scheme of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.25 This argument is based
upon the presumption that Congress could have expressly provided a federal
court remedy for the breach of duty of fair representation in the Act but
chose not to do so in favor of an alternative remedial framework. Therefore,
under this argument, the courts may not imply federal question jurisdiction
in this instance. This article examines both of these arguments and concludes
that the specific nature and goal of the duty of fair representation compels
the extension of that duty and of federal court jurisdiction to federal sector
labor relations.
The Tent~h Circuit's brief opinion in Pham provides the proper analytical
framework for approaching these problems. 6 The structure of the opinion

18. Id. § 7114(a)(1).
19. Vaca, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
20. 799 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1986).
21. 764 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 527 (1985).
22. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1397; National Fed'n Fed. Employees, Local 1263 v. Commandant,
Defense Lang. Inst., 493 F. Supp. 675, 681 n.8. (N.D. Cal. 1980).
23. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1982)).
24. Id. Section 301 granted federal court jurisdiction over suits for breaches of collective
bargaining agreements. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957).
25. Tucker v. Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, 607 F. Supp.
1232, 1240 ().R.I. 1985); Yates, 533 F. Supp. at 465.
26. The opinion takes up not quite six pages in the Federal Reporter, 2d series.
The facts of Pham can be summarized as follows. Sharon Pham was to be terminated from
her position as supply clerk for the Air Force. Pham, 799 F.2d at 635. She decided to appeal that
decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and requested her union, Local 916,
AFGE, to file th2 appropriate papers. Id. The union filed the papers ninety days too late and the
MSPB refused thie grievance. Id. Ms. Pham then began her duty-of-fair-representation suit in
state court and it was removed to the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. Id. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 636,
and the Tenth Circuit reversed, id. at 635.
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will serve as the organizational skeleton for this article: an examination of
the goals and history of the Civil Service Reform Act; 27 a discussion of
private sector duty-of-fair-representation
jurisprudence; 28 and a review of the
29
applicable authorities.

I. The Legislative History of the Civil Service Reform Act
As befitting a "comprehensive revision of the laws governing the rights
and obligations of civil servants," ' 3 the legislative history of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 is voluminous. 31 In contrast, the history pertaining to
the duty of fair representation under the CSRA or to federal court jurisdic32
tion for breaches of collective bargaining agreements is nearly nonexistent.
Civil service reform in the United States began with the Pendelton Act of
1883." That Act was a reaction to the political patronage system 34 and to the
abuses that led to the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled
political office seeker. 35 The Pendelton Act provided for appointment to the
36
Federal Civil Service on a merit basis through competitive examination,
rather than through political cronyism.
Congress' next legislation on the issue came in response 37 to executive
orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade federal employees to
communicate directly with members of Congress without prior permission of
their superiors. 3 8 The Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 reaffirmed the merit
system and provided for an extremely limited role for unions in the federal
service. Specifically, the Act provided3 9that membership in such organizations
was not good cause for termination.
27. Id. at 636-37. See part I infra.
28. Id. at 637-38. See part II infra.
29. Id. at 638-39. See part III infra.

30. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 91.
31. The reprinted and compiled legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
fills two volumes plus a separate volume of Committee hearings totalling 3,564 pages.
32. See infra notes 64-125 and accompanying text.
33. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1882).
34. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL SERVICE AND RETRENCHMENT, S. REP. No. 576,
47th Cong.,

Ist
Sess.

2 (1882); HousE COMM. ON PosT OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, HISTORY OF

THE CIVIL SERVICE MERIT SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES,

94th Cong., 2d Sess., 26-173 (1976).
35. A.

HOOGENBOOM,

OUTLAWING THE SPOILs: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

MOVEMENT, 1865-1883, at 212 (1961).
36. 22 Stat. 403, ch. 27, § 2 (1881).
37. 48 CONG. REC. 4513 (remarks of Rep. Gregg) (1912); id. at 4653 (remarks of Rep.
Calder); id. at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackman); id. at 5201 (remarks of Rep. Prouty); id. at
5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id. at 5634 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id. at 5637-38
(remarks of Rep. Wilson); id. at 10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id. at 10673 (remarks of Sen.
Reed); id. at 10799 (remarks of Sen. LaFollette).
38. Exec. Order No. 1142 (1906) (President T. Roosevelt); Exec. Order No. 1514 (1904)
(President Taft).
39. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 7513 (1982)):
Provided, however, That membership in any society, association, club or other
form of organization of postal employees not affiliated with any outside organiza-
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However, no thorough examination of labor-management relations in the
private sector was done until President Kennedy commissioned a Presidential
Task Force to report on the issue and recommend a solution to the
problem.40 That report, entitled "A Policy for Employee-Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service,""' became, in substance, his Executive
Order No. 10988.42
That order, as amended by subsequent presidential orders, was loosely
modeled on private sector labor relations. 43 Inter alia, it gave employees the
right to join or not to join labor organizations," set up the Federal Labor
Relations Council,4 permitted federal agencies lawfully to recognize
unions, 4 6 accorded exclusive representative status to lawfully recognized
organizations 47 permitted limited collective bargaining 48 and grievance
mechanisms, 4 and provided certain administrative procedures by which prohibited conduct, called unfair labor practices,50 could be resolved."
Eventually, however, the executive order system was perceived as subject
to several abuses, e.g., the promotion and immunization of bureaucratic
sloth52 by the complex administrative appeals process," insufficient protection for "whistle-blowers," 5 4 and political abuse of the merit system." In the

tion imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike against the United States, having for its objects,
among other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, by any
person or groups of persons in said postal service, or the presenting by any such
person or groups of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or any
Member thereof shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of persons from said service.
40. Memorandum on Employee-Management Relations in the FederalServices, PUB. PAPERS
(President Kennedy) 469 (June 22, 1961).
41. PRESIDErr's TASK FORCE,

REPORT ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS IN THE

FEDERAL SERVICE (1961).
42. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963) (President Kennedy).
43. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970); Exec. Order Nos. 11,616, 1i,636,
11,838, 3 C.F.R. 605, 634, 957 (1971-1975). See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REP., supra note
41, at 7; Rosenblum & Steinbach, FederalEmployee LaborRelations: From the "Gag Rule" to
Executive Order 11491, 59 Ky. L.J. 833, 842, 847 (1971).
44. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959-1963).
45. Id. § 4.
46. Id. § 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. §,9, 11.
49. Id. § 8.
50. Id. § 1.
51. Id. § 4.
52. See Developments, supra note 12, at 1631; Message of President Carter, Mar. 2, 1978,
reprintedin -I.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 98-99.
53. E.g., S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEtWS 2723, 2725.
54. See, e.g., C. PETERS & T. BRANCH, BLOWING THE WHISTLE, DISSENT INTHE PUBLIC IN.
TEREST 22-275 (1972) ("whistle-blowers" are employees who disclose corruption or waste in
government).
55. E.g., FinalReport on Violations andAbuses of Merit Principlesin FederalEmployment:
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labor relations arena, the executive orders suffered from a federal ad-

ministrative body that was both adjudicative and prosecutorial, as well as
perceived to be under the control of management.

6

Further, the role of col-

lective bargaining and unions generally was sharply circumscribed.

7

It was

against this background that Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act

of 1978, which was proclaimed as "the most comprehensive reform of the
federal work force since passage of the Pendelton Act in 1883."1

Much of the controversy over the Civil Service Reform Act centered
around issues not germane to this article.

9

Even the debate over Title VII,

dealing with labor-management relations in the public sector, dealt with
issues only tangentially related to the duty of fair representation.60 The con-

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 245-46 (1976).
56. E.g., S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 5.
57. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970) (limits on negotiating
power); § 7(1) and (2) (limits on grievance procedures); § 8(a) and (b) (same); § 11(b) (limited
meet and confer obligations); § 12(c) (no union security agreements). See generally Rosenblum
& Steinbach, supra note 43, at 855-62.
58. S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 1.
59. Separation of Civil Service Commission functions: id. at 4-5; id. at 133-34 (views of
Sens. Mathias and Stevens); H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 6-7; id. at 388 (supplementary views of Rep. Solarz); id. at 386-87 (dissenting view of Rep. Harris).
Protection for whistle-blowers: S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 8 (supplementary view of
Rep. Schroeder).
Creation of the Senior Executive Service: id. at 10-11; id. at 135-39 (views of Sens. Mathias
and Stevens); H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 10-11; id. at 390-91 (supplementary views
of Rep. Solarz); id. at 394 (dissenting views of Rep. Harris); id. at 418-22 (views of Rep.
Gilman); 124 CONG. REc. H9415-39 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978).
The "pay for performance" appraisal/incentive system: S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at
11-12; H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 11; id. at 389 (supplementary views of Rep.
Solarz); id. at 396-97 (dissenting views of Rep. Harris); 124 CONG. REc. H9439-48 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1978).
Veterans' preference provisions: S. REp. No. 969, supra note 53, at 126-28 (additional views
of Sen. Percy); H.R. REp. 1403, supra note 10, at 8-9; id. at 380-82 (supplementary views of
Rep. Hanley); id. at 385-86 (supplementary views of Rep. Schroeder); id. at 389 (supplementary
views of Rep. Solarz); id. at 407 (views of Rep. Taylor); id. at 414-17 (views of Reps. Gilman,
Derwinski, Rousselot, Collins, and Taylor); 124 CONG. REC. S14283-88, (daily ed. Aug. 24,
1978); id. at H8463-64, (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Derwinski).
Reducing the size of the bureaucracy: S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 131-32 (additional
views of Sen. Heinz); H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 397-98 (dissenting views of Rep.
Harris); id. at 411 (views of Reps. Collins and Lott); id. at 413 (views of Rep. Leach); 124 CONG.
REC. H9404-07 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978); id. at H9413-14 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
60. Congressional debate centered on the following issues-questions of union certification
as the bargaining representative without a secret ballot: H.R. REP. No 1403, supra note 10, at
377-79 (supplementary views of Reps. Clay, Ford, Heftel, Meyers, Schroeder, Solarz, and
Wilson); id. at 409 (views of Rep. Taylor); 124 CONG. REC. S14311, S14313 (daily ed. Aug. 24,
1978); id. at H9453-9653 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
Legitimacy of strike and picketing weapons: H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 377-79
(supplementary views of Reps. Clay, Ford, Heftel, Meyers, Schroeder, Solarz, and Wilson); id.
at 413 (views of Rep. Leach); 124 CONG. REc. S14311, S14315-16 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978); id.
at H9453-9653 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
Union security arrangements: H.R. ReP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 377-79 (supplementary
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troversy over Title VII provoked many familiar philosophical arguments.
The public sector was viewed as distinct from the private sector because
marketplace control was absent and because salaries and benefits came from
taxes and not profits. Unionization would have harmful effects on governmental budget-making and sovereignty; and the public, and thus government,

was unable to refuse resolutely to accede to employee demands or strikes .6
These are concerns over which critical commentary
been sharply divided.

2

and court opinion

3

have

The Duty of Fair Representation
In contrast, Congress paid no attention to the duty of fair representation.

In the 179 pages in the CongressionalRecord of the House debate on House
views); id. at 400-01 (separate views of Reps. Derwinski, Corcoran, and Leach); id. at 40910
(views of Rep. Taylor); id. at 12; 124 CONG. REC. H9453-9653 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978).
Scope of permissible bargaining and negotiations: H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 12;
id. at 377-79 (supplementary views); id. at 400-01 (separate views of Reps. Derwinski, Corcoran,
and Leach); id. at 404-05 (supplementary views of Reps. Rousselot, Collins, Derwinski, Lott,
and Taylor); id. at 409 (views of Rep. Taylor); 124 CONG. REC. at H9453-9653 (daily ed. Sept.
11, 1978).
61. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 404-05 (views of Reps. Rousselot, Collins,
Derwinski, Lott, and Taylor); 124 CONG. REc. H9651-52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Rousselo:).
62. See, e.g., Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes
Democracy, I GOV'T UNION REv. 5 (1980); Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector
Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 63-139 (1974); Letter from President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President, National Federation of Federal Employees (Aug. 16,
1973), reprinted in,Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employees, 1 LAn. L.J. 604, 612
(1950).
For criticisms of the sovereignty and delegation arguments, see W. VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN TI-E UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 7-12 (1975);
UNIONS AND T-E CITIES 16-18, 36-41 (1971); Edwards, The

17-19 (1966); J.

WEITZMAN, THE

H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE
Developing Labor Relations Law in
the Public Seclor, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (1972); Meltzer & Sunstein, Public Employee
Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 735,
738-42 (1983).
63. See, e.g., City of Fort Smith v. Arkansas State Council, No. 38, 245 Ark. 409, 433
S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (1968); Teachers v. Board of Pub. Instr., 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2466, 2469
(Fla. 1968) (stating that a grant to public employees of the right to strike in the absence of
statutory authorization would be a "first step toward anarchy"); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32
Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d
539, 544, 545-56 (1947); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131
A.2d 59, 61 (1957); Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552-53 (Sup.
Ct. 1967); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
("Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the state can
dictate to the Government the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry on
essential services vtal to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen."), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 A.D. 470, 47 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y.
315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944), af'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). For criticisms of the sovereignty and
delegation arguments, Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1,
3-4 (D. Minn. 1982) (three-judge panel), rev'd sub nom. Minnesota State Bd. for Community
College v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482 11951).
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Bill 11280 and the Joint Conference Report on Senate Bill 2640, not a single
mention is made of the duty of fair representation or related topics. 6" The

final legislation itself makes only a problematic reference to that duty. Section 7114(a)(1) of the Civil Service Reform Act provides:
If a labor organization has been accorded exclusive recognition,
such organization is the exclusive representative of employees in

the appropriate unit and is entitled to ask for and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering all employees in such unit. It
is responsiblefor representing the interests of all employees in the
unit without discriminationand without regardto labor organiza-

tion membership.65

Although it is disputed, some courts have found this provision to codify the
private duty of fair representation in the federal sector. 66 Yet, if this section
was supposed to encompass the large and still evolving body of duty-of-fairrepresentation jurisprudence in the private sector, congressional indications
to that effect are missing. The only congressional mention of section
7114(a)(1) merely restates the provision without explanation as to its
67
significance or interpretation.

The language itself is taken almost verbatim from President Kennedy's Ex-

ecutive Order No. 10988:
When an employee organization has been recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees of an appropriate

unit, it shall be entitled to ask for and negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit and shall be responsible for repre-

senting the interests of all such employees without discrimination
and without regard to employee organization membership. 68

However, the intent behind this provision is open to question. Despite its
later interpretation,6 9 one might argue the executive order was not concerned
with the duty of fair representation as that duty had been interpreted by the

federal courts.7 ° Instead, the order may have been originally designed to pre-

64. 124 CONG. REC. H8460-75 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978); id., H9277-885 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1978); id., H9356-9461 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978); id., H9617-71 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978); id.,
HI 1820-27 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
65. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). This language was identical in
both the House and Senate versions of the Act. Compare H.R. 11280, § 7114(a), reprintedin 1
LEG. Hisr., supra note 10, at 597 with 52640, § 7114(a)(1), reprintedin I LEG. Hisr. at 1248.
66. See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 48; S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 104. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 127-60 (1978) does not even mention section
7114(a)(1) in its recapitulation of the bill's provisions.
68. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 524 (1959-1963). Compare CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §
7114(a)(1) (1982).
69. E.g., NFFE, Local 1453, 23 F.L.R.A. 686 (1986); AFGE, Local 2126, 1 F.L.R.A. 993
(1979); NTEU, ch. 202, 1 F.L.R.A. 910 (1979); U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Naval Ordnance Station, 3 F.L.R.C. 866 (1975).
70. By 1962, the Supreme Court had decided only Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323
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vent the infringement of employees' civil rights with respect to race, color,
creed, national origin, and religion. Antidiscrimination was a priority of the
Kennedy administration, 7 ' and thus antidiscrimination provisions were
specifically included in the executive order as mandatory qualifications for
unions in the federal sector.7 If the provision in the executive order was in
fact designed only to protect civil rights, then it obviously was not intended
to encompass the private sector duty of fair representation. Although the
judicially developed duty of fair representation had its genesis in racialdiscrimination complaints, 73 it had been "extended beyond the racial factor
[involved] in the Steele case '7 4 by 1962 when President Kennedy issued the
executive order, and thus it encompassed more than protecting employees
from discrimination. 7 Therefore, since the origins of the antidiscrimination
language are unclear in the executive order and congressional history is absent,7' 6 the interpretation of the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act
which mimic that language is similarly clouded.
Nevertheless, the issue is only theoretically significant.7 7 Regardless of
whether Congress intended to codify the duty of fair representation in section
7114(a)(1), that section clearly gave exclusive representative status to lawfully

U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), and Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
71. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,063 (Equal Opportunity in Housing), reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4386-89; Exec. Order No. 10,925 (Establishment of Presidential
Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, Non-Discrimination in Federal Employment),
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1274-80 (especially §§ 304-305, Labor
Unions and Representatives of Workers). See also Exec. Order No. 10,980 (Establishing the
Presidential Commission on the Status of Women), reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4252-53.
72. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 2(3), 3 C.F.R. 522 (1959-1963).
73. See injra notes 130-133.
74. Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
75. E.g., Fekar v. Local No. 181, Int'l Union of United Brewery Workers, 311 F.2d 628 (6th
Cir. 1962) (seniority between the employees of two plants); Trotter v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec., Ry. & Motor Coach Empls., Local 1303, 309 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1962) (suburban
and interstate drivers); Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S. 967 (1956) (seniority rights of plant transferees); Ostrofsky v.
United Steel Workers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), pert.
denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960) (dismissal of employees refusing to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities).
76. One might argue that the congressional silence on this issue only underscores the need for
the protection provided by the duty of fair representation. One of the fundamental premises of
the duty is that the individual employee's rights may be lost due to the structural bias in the
labor laws in favor of the more powerful institutional actors, the employer and the union. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1967). Representatives of both management and labor testified
before the congressional committees in hearings on the Civil Service Reform Act. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 14-17; Hearings Before the Conu. on Post Office & Civil Service on H.R. 11280, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-1025 (1978). Those persons could be expected not to
be extremely interested in drawing legislative attention to a legal doctrine in which they are
potential defendants.
77. But see Warren v. Local 1759, AFGE, 764 F.2d 1395, 1399 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985).
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recognized unions.." Further, the legislative history of the Act clearly shows
that Congress meant for unions to have an increased role in collective
bargaining and grievance procedures." The increased role of unions was a
congressional trade-off for a strengthening of management prerogatives in
other sections of the Act." Thus, the legislative history of the Act shows a
congressional policy shift toward the protection of employee rights through
collective bargaining and away from traditional civil service administrative
remedies and safeguards. 8 ' This shift marked the movement of public sector
82
labor-management relations toward the private model.
Both opponents and proponents of the legislation agreed that federal sector labor relations should approach the situation developed in the private
arena. The real question was to what extent, 83 particularly with respect to the

78. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7111(a) (1982).
79. 124 CONG. REC. H8462 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall); id. at
H8468-69 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay); id. at HI1825-26 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Taylor); id. at H9647 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Taylor).
80. 124 CONG. REC. H11825-26 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Taylor); id. at
H9633 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall); id. at H9647 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Ford).
81. "It [Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act] will permit the establishment through collective bargaining of grievance and arbitration systems ... Such proceedings will largely displace
the multiple appeal systems which now exist and which are unanimously perceived as too costly,
too cumbersome and ineffective." Message of President Carter, Mar. 2, 1978, reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 102.
Mr. Speaker, a major criticism leveled against the civil service system dealt with
employees' rights. The press in particular was quick to pick up on employees who
apparently abused the rules by prolonging a transfer, demotion, or dismissal. This
will no longer be possible, however. Instead of the "preponderance of the evidence
rule" a manager will now only have to prove by "substantial evidence" that the
employee is performing unsatisfactorily and [can] therefore be dismissed. The new
standard adopted by the conferees will enhance a manager's authority to remove
incompetent and inefficient workers within a reasonably shorter length of time.
As a counterbalance to these new procedures the conference report contains
stronger measures to allow Federal workers to organize, join, and contribute to a
union. Presently, labor-management relations are governed by an Executive order
issued during the Kennedy administration. During this 16-year period the unions
have acted responsibly on behalf of their members. As a result employee unions
have earned the statutory recognition and protection provided under this bill.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill. It represents the collective efforts of many people. It has balanced the needs of the Federal employee to feel secure from political
and personal reprisals against the public's expectations for an honest, hard-

working, and efficient civil service system.
124 CONG. REC. Hl1825 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Lehman) (emphasis added).
See also 124 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford).
82. Message of President Carter, Mar. 2, 1978, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note
10, at 102; id. at 404 (additional views of Reps. Rousselot, Collins, Derwinski, Lott, and
Taylor); 124 CONG. REc. H8462 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall); id. at H8466
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay); id. at S14281 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Sasser).
83. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 404-05 (additional views of Reps. Rousselot,
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scope of bargadning."' Many legislative opponents were concerned about the
efficiency of the federal service. Specifically, they were concerned that

management's ability to set the terms and conditions of employment would
be destroyed by the proposed law." Yet, supporters of the Civil Service
Reform Act worried that the legislation went too far in granting rights to
management in the name of efficiency. Thus, increased union power was
given as a counterbalance. 6
Congressional desire for efficiency is one of the reasons given for denying
federal court jurisdiction over government union duty-of-fair-representation
suits. In congressional debates, efficiency in the federal service is equated
with management flexibility and the simplification or acceleration of

employee review and dismissal procedures.87 Of these, only the concern with
streamlining the appeals process bears much relevance to the question of per-

mitting cou:rt jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation challenges.
Despite the language of the Senate Report quoted in Martel v. Carroll,"

the balance of the Senate Report makes it clear that the trade-off for reduced
administrative safeguards was an augmented union role in the protection of
employee rights."' This increased union role was touted as being "more efficient, less time consuming and less formal than the statutory appeals

system." 90 Further efficiency and a business-like approach were intended to
be gained in this process by having the union serve as a screen for frivolous
or nonmeritorious employee grievances and appeals. 9'

Collins, Derwinski, Lott, and Taylor); 124 CONG. REC. H9651-52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Rousselot).
84. See supra note 60.
85. "It seems likely, if not certain, that Title VII would greatly increase the power of
Government employee unions to the detriment of the public interest in the predictable and efficient provision of Government services." H.R. REP. No. 1043, supra note 10, at 404 (views of
Reps. Rousselot, Collins, Derwinski, Lott, and Taylor). Cf. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1982)
(collective bargaining contributes to the effective conduct of the public business); Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 103.
86. E.g., 124 CONG. REc. HI 1825 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Lehman) (power
of management tc.
deal quickly and efficiently with incompetent employees balanced by increased
union rights). .4ccord, id. at H9633 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall) (efficiency
and management flexibility not impaired by balance provided by union rights).
87. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 9-10 (dismissals); id. at 10-11 (Senior Executive Service); id. at 11-12 (merit pay increases).
88. 565 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D. Mass. 1983) ("Congress sought to ensure the efficiency of the
Civil Service by establishing a system which '[aillowis] civil servants to be hired and fired more
easily, but for the right reasons.' ") (citing S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 4). See also
Tucker v. Delfene Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, 607 F. Supp. 1232,
1244 (D.R.I. 1985).
89. S.REP. No. 969, supranote 53, at 10 ("As an alternative to the appeals process the bill
provides for bargaining by members of bargaining units to establish arbitration procedures for
the handling of adverse actions."). Accord 124 CONG. REc. H11821 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Lehman); id. at H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford). Accord, Department of Defense v.FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 945 (192).
90. 124 CONG. REC. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford).
91. Id.
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Members of Congress recognized that there were three parties to labor

relations-management, unions, and individuals-and that collective rights
and individual ones were not always the same. 92 The potential conflict be-

tween individual and collective rights coupled with the union screening
mechanism were some of the considerations the United States Supreme Court

found in Vaca v. Sipes that mandated the imposition of the duty of fair

representation in the private sector. 93 Therefore, as federal employee labor
organizations began to fulfill the same roles as their private sector counter-

parts, 9 the corresponding need for a judicially enforced duty of fair
representation increased. 95 Far from implying that efficiency prevented dutyof-fair-representation suits in the federal courts, the legislative history of the
Act intimates a need for such checks on the unions' power.
Federal Court Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues did not claim a large portion of the congressional attention span in the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act. Nevertheless,
some time was spent on these issues. Two versions of the bill were debated in
the House-the Collins amendments to Title VII 96 and the Udall substitute
for the Collins provisions. 97

92. 124 CONG. REC. H9647 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford). In many ways
this dichotomy is evident in the debate over mandatory union security agreements and certification without a secret election. See H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 377-79 (supplementary
views of Reps. Clay, Ford, Heftel, Meyers, Schroeder, Solarz, and Wilson) (union security); 124
CONG. REc. at H9640 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook) (union certification).
93. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See generally notes 182-186 infra and accompanying text.
94. See generally Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 107-08.
95. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186 ("We cannot believe that Congress in conferring upon
employers and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to confer
upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of
contract.").
The only possible reference to a duty of fair representation in the entire congressional
legislative history is Representative Ford's brief mention of it on the floor of the House when introducing the joint House-Senate Committee bill. While discussing the scope of the negotiated
grievance process under the CSRA, he stated: "The labor organization is required to meet a duty
of fair representation for all employees, even if not dues paying members, who use the
negotiated grievance procedure." 124 CONG. REC. H13609 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Ford). Representative Ford had been discussing the general replacement of administrative
remedies with the negotiated grievance procedure. In this context, the duty of fair representation
clearly was viewed as a check on the unions' expanded powers. Further, one might argue that if
the duty of fair representation does exist, it should be construed analogously to that duty in the
private sector and, thus, be cognizable in federal courts. However, Representative Ford's statement means that at least one congressman believed that the duty of fair representation exists in
the federal sector. Since it was not challenged, the inference may be that the others did not find
that statement controversial enough to reply. Although spun from the remark of a single
legislator, this attenuated logic seems to be consistent with the tenor of legislative debate on Title
VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.
96. The Collins amendment is set forth at 124 CONG. REc. H9618-24 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1978).
97. The Udall substitute amendment is at 124 CONG. REC. H9625-32 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1978).
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The Collins amendments would have provided, inter alia, for no judicial
review or enforcement of Federal Labor Relations Authority decisions except
on constitutional questions. 8 This amendment was consistent with the
judicial role, if any, of the supplanted executive order. 9 The reason for the
Collins amendments on this point was the fear of Representative James Collins (Rep., Tex.) that an individual might challenge an action of the FLRA
judicially rather than administratively, thus creating overcrowded courts and
more paperwork and weakening the power of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. 10

No discussion of this provision was made by any other member of Congress, and the Collins amendment was defeated in favor of the Udall
substitute,'" which provided for judicial review of FLRA decisions. The
Civil Service Reform Act as enacted is identical to the Udall amendment in
this respect.' 2 Thus, at a minimum, it can be inferred that no other member
of Congress felt strongly enough about the risks of judicial review to argue
that point on the floor. More strongly, it might be hypothesized that Congress affirmatively disapproved the notion that the courts would infringe
upon the statutory and administrative scheme. In any event, the two houses
of Congress provided for judicial oversight,' 0 3 which had previously not existed.'" 4 Thus, the Civil Service Reform Act reflects a congressional intent
that both the judiciary and the administrative agencies are intended to play a
role in the enforcement of the Act.' 05

98. Id. at H9625, H9639-40 (remarks of Rep. Collins about his section 7204(1)).
99. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 464 U.S. at 92 (no judicial review of Federal

Labor Relations Council orders).
100. The committee bill seriously weakens the Federal Labor Relations Authority by
providing that all of its decisions and orders are subject to judicial review in any
U.S. district court.
What would happen under this judicial review is that one individual could go to
court irstead of bringing it before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, this
when our courts are so overcrowded. Although we want everyone to have full

recourse to judicial review, this would mean that it would go to the court system if
one indvidual wished, and this would mean unending litigation and would make
the paperwork on this unbearable.
124 CONG. REC. H9639-40 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978).
Apparently, Representative Collins misspoke when he stated review of FLRA orders under the

House bill was in the United States district courts. Other than section 7121(c) discussed at notes 10619 infra,the only provision of the bill dealing with judicial review appears in section 7123(a) and (b)
and places review in the court of appeals. See H.R. 11,280, supra note 65, § 2123(a) and (b), at
606-07. Thus, the import, if any, of his comments may be undercut by his misunderstanding.
101. 124 CONG. REc. H9653 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1987).
102. CompareUdall, § 23(a) and (b), 124 CONG. REC. H9631 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978), with
CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) and (b) (1982).
103. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (1982).
104. Cf. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms,464 U.S. at 92 (no judicial review of Federal Labor Relations Council orders).
105. Even that statutory grant of jurisdiction has not been held to encompass the sole func-

tion of federal courts within the Civil Service Reform Act statutory scheme. United States v.
PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir. 1971).
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More directly relevant to the duty-of-fair-representation issue is the
legislative history with regard to H.R. 11280, section 7121(c):
Any party to a collective bargaining agreement aggrieved by the

failure, neglect, or refusal of the other party to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the negotiated grievance provided in the agree-

ment may file a petition in the appropriate United States District
Court requesting an order directing that arbitration proceed pur-

suant to the procedures provided therefor in the agreement. The
court shall hear the matter without jury, expedite the hearing to
the maximum extent practicable, and issue any order it determines
appropriate.0 6
That provision of the House Bill was subsequently excised from the final

version of the Civil Service Reform Act after the joint House-Senate conference."' It is the removal of this provision that some courts have used as
the basis for refusing to permit plaintiffs to bring duty-of-fair-representation
suits in federal court.'

Those courts perceive H.R. 11280, section 7121(c) to

be the analogue to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.'0 9
Not only are the two sections different in language"0 and in scope,"' but
the only mention of H.R. 11280, section 7121(c) in the entire legislative
history of the Civil Service Reform Act is in the traditional restatement of all
provisions of the legislation in the report introducing that bill before the
House."' The House Report regarding section 7121(c) shows that the purposes of the provision focused on the single issue of compelling arbitration

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

H.R. 11,280, supra note 65, § 7121(c), at 606.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 157.
See infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
See supranote 23, discussed in Warren. See infra notes 263-366 and accompanying text.
Compare H.R. 11280, supra note 65, § 7121(c) with 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
111. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (section 301 must be given broad
interpretation); Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass'n v. Painters & Decorators Jt. Comm. of
East Bay Counties, 707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.), reh. denied, 717 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984) (section 301 must be given broad interpretation); Lerwill v. Inflight
Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978) (section 301 encompasses not only suits between employers and unions, but also those brought by individual employees to vindicate
uniquely personal rights); Maita v. Killeen, 465 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (same).
112. Subsection (c) of section 7121 provides that either party to an agreement may seek
to compel the other to proceed to arbitration by filing a complaint in the appropriate U.S. District Court, or in any appropriate court of a State, territory, or
possession of the United States. The court shall hear the matter without a jury in
an expedited manner and shall decide whether to issue an order that arbitration
proceed under the terms of the agreement.
H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 56.
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under a collective bargaining agreement.I" Proposed section 7121(c) implied
only that either the union or the agency would have the power to sue the
other to compel arbitration. No mention is made in that report, or in contemporaneous portions of the CongressionalRecord, of any other purpose for
the provision. Thus, section 7121(c) is not relevant to the present inquiry. In
duty-of-fair-representation suits, neither the union nor the employer is the
plaintiff, and the relief sought is not this type of arbitration order.
In fact, at no time did a member of Congress ever discuss section 7121(c),
much less even hint that it was intended to address the issue of federal court
jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation breaches. Indeed, it is not even
clear from the language of the proposal whether section 7121(c) was intended
to cover the question of federal jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements other than those brought to compel arbitration.
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act predated the Civil
Service Reform Act by thirty-one years."" If the House had intended to
create a parallel in the Civil Service Reform Act to section 301, presumably it
would have lone so more clearly, more consciously, and with unequivocably
referable language.'" Further, the removal of section 7121(c) by the Joint
House-Senate Committee gives no indication of why the provision was not
retained.
House section 7121(c) authorizes any party to a collective bargaining agreement to directly seek a District Court order requiring the
other party to proceed to arbitration rather than referring the
matter to the Authority. The Senate has no comparable provision.
The House recedes. All questions of this matter will be considered
'6
at least in the first instance by the Authority.
Nor is there any explanation in the Congressional Record for the
deletion." 7 Apparently, neither the presence nor the absence of the provision
occasioned much thought on the part of Congress. The inferences which may
be drawn from the cryptic comment, "The House recedes, ""' are
minimal." 9
Finally, although Congress clearly envisioned the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 as a comprehensive revision of labor-management relations in the
federal sector,' 20 there were existing legislative models from which Congress
113. Id.
114. Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act was enacted in 1947. The Civil Service Reform Act became law in 1978.
115. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a) and (b)
with 29 U.S.C. § 15:3(a) and (b). Accord, S. REP. No. 969, supranote 53, at 102, 106; H.R. REP.
No. 1403, supra note 10, at 41-42; Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See
generally Aaron, supra note 10, at 1097.
116. H.R. CO'W'. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 157.
117. See 124 COtG. REC. H11820-27 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
118. H.R. CO'NF. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 157.
119. But see Phain, 799 F.2d at 639. See infra notes 288-289 and accompanying text.

120. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 464 U.S. at 91; United States v. PATCO, 653
F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1971); S.REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 1.
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could obtain guidance. The basis for the Act was the private sector paradigm

of the National Labor Relations Act,' 2' which implied judicial cognizance of
duty-of-fair-representation suits,

tional basis.'

23

22

even without section 301 as a jurisdic-

As stated by the Supreme Court:

In passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress unquestionably
intended to strengthen the position of federal unions and to make

the collective-bargaining process a more effective instrument of
the public interest than it had been under the Executive Order
regime. There is no evidence, however, that the Act departed from
the basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the

public and the private sector that the parties proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self

interest.124

Thus, the silence of Congress on the specific issues of duty of fair
representation and the appropriateness of federal court jurisdiction ought not
Rather, the silence more properly should
be viewed as conscious disapproval.
25
acceptance.
tacit
as
be perceived
II.

Genesis of the Duty of Fair Representation

126
Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Railway Labor Act

121. See, e.g., supra note 10.
122. See infra notes 149-186 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 284-287 and accompanying text.
124. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 107-08 (citations omitted).
125. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1971) (court upholds jurisdiction of federal district
court to enjoin federal employee union strikes despite the Civil Service Reform Act placing such
activity within the province of the FLRA and even though the 5 U.S.C. § 7123 grant of judicial
review does not encompass this activity). "It is a familiar maxim of statutory interpretation that
courts should enforce a statute in such a manner that its overriding purpose will be achieved,
even if the words used leave room for a contrary interpretation." Id. at 1141 (quoting Haberman
v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1969)). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, which had
held that the limited scope of section 7123(d) "embrace[d] the only role given the federal courts
under the statute." Id. at 1138 (citing United States v. PATCO, No. 80-C-4390, mem. op. at 5
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1980)).
Under the prior labor relations scheme of Executive Orders Nos. 10,988 and 11,491, there is
no indication that duty-of-fair-representation suits in the federal courts were preempted by that
comprehensive administrative system. Only one case directly discussed the issue of federal court
jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation breaches under the executive orders. See Kuhn v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 570 F.2d 757, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1978) (executive
order scheme appropriate prior to coverage of employees by NLRA through the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1982)). That decision denied jurisdiction on the
sole basis that the executive orders were not "laws of the United States" for the purposes of
general federal question power under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Id. The court's decision may have
implied that, had the duty of fair representation been through federal legislative action rather
than executive action, jurisdiction would have existed. See Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 528 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1976) (prior decision in same case which assumed federal
district court jurisdiction over duty of fair representation claim). Cf. NFFE v. Commandant,
Defense Lang. Inst., 493 F. Supp. 675, 681 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
126. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (as amended by 48 Stat. 1185 (1934); 49 Stat. 1198 (1936); 54 Stat.
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contains an explicit statutory duty of fair representation. 27 Rather, in the
private sector, the duty of fair representation is a federal obligation that has
been judicially fashioned from the national
labor statutes 28 and is part of the
29
federal common law of labor relations.'
The evolution of this doctrine can be traced in a series of Supreme Court
decisions under the Railway Labor and the National Labor Relations acts. In
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,'30 the Supreme Court set aside a
union bargained-for seniority system that discriminated against blacks. The
Court stated that the exclusive representative status of the union granted by
the statute imposed a concomitant duty to represent all members, majority
and minority alike.' The Court held that the language of the Railway Labor
Act and its purposes "expressed the aims of Congress to impose on the
bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise

fairly the power conferred upon it on behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them."' 32
In a companion case to Steele, the Court held that the right to be
represented without discrimination was a federal right derived by implication
from the Railway Labor Act.'33 This duty was extended almost ten years later
to unions certified under the National Labor Relations Act in Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffnan.' 3 Subsequent cases elaborated on the duty of fair representation.' 3 Finally, in 1967 the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of
Vaca v. Sipes. 6
In Vaca, Benjamin Owens sued his union, Local 12 of the National
Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, and its officers for breach of the
union's duty of fair representation.' 37 Specifically, Owens alleged that, due

785, 786 (1940); 64 Stat. 1236 (1951); 78 Stat. 748 (1964); 80 Stat. 208 (1966)) (current version
codified in 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)).
127. Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and National
Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. CoM. 167 (1968).
128. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234,
1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971). See also Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Empls. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971).
129. 2. C. MORHS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1285 (2d ed. 1983).
130. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
131. Id. at 202.
132. Id. at 203.
133. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944).
134. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
135. E.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Syres v. Oil Workers, Local 23, 350
U.S. 892 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1955) (conferring federal question
jurisdiction over claims by black oil workers that the union had negotiated separate
discriminatory seniority progressions).
136. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Since Vaca, the Court has continued to reaffirm and expand the
duty of fair representation. E.g., Del Costello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Bowen v.
United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679 (1981); Electrical Workers (iBEW) v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554 (1976); Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Empls. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
137. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 173.
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to his health problems, he had been discriminatorily discharged by his
employer, Swift and Company, in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.' 38 He further alleged that the union had refused to process his
grievance with Swift through the final levels of arbitration. 39 After a jury
verdict in Owens' favor in the Missouri state court, the trial judge reversed
and set aside the verdict on the ground that the National Labor Relations
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.' 40 The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed and reinstated the verdict,'' and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 42 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
White,'4 3 held that although there was concurrent jurisdiction in the state
courts, the duty of fair representation was a federal obligation that required
application of the governing federal standards."" Since the applicable federal
standards were not applied, the Court reversed the Missouri Supreme
45
Court.'
In so holding, the Court in Vaca specifically recognized the union's exclusive bargaining representative status as the source of the duty of fair
representation' 46 and further stated that a breach of that duty occurred "only
when a union's conduct towards a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.' ' 4 7 More importantly, the Supreme
Court in Vaca held that the duty of fair representation was not preempted by
the unfair labor practices provisions of the NLRA. The argument for
preemption that had been unsuccessfully advanced by the union in Vaca is
directly analogous to the arguments for preemption made in the federal sector duty-of-fair-representation cases. Specifically, it is argued that sections of

138. Id. at 173-75.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 173.
Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
Vaca, 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 173.

144. Id.
145. Id.

146. [T]he exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated
unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct .... It is obvious that
[plaintiff's] ...complaint alleged a breach by the Union of a duty grounded in
federal statutes.
Id. at 177.
147. Id. at 190. Generally, a union is not liable for negligence. But cf. Ruzicka v. General
Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 707 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 982 (1983), (clarifiedin 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981)); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways,
Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1978). Because due process requires accurate fact finding,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970), some commentators have stated that constitutional
considerations mandate a standard of procedural nonnegligence more stringent than Vaca. Note,
Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of Fair Representation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 752, 784-85 (1976). See also Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 64 MASS. L. REv. 183, 255-63 (1980).
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the Civil Service Reform Act dealing with unfair labor practices foreclose
breaches of the duty of fair representafederal court jurisdiction over alleged
48
tion in federal labor relations.'

In Vaca the Supreme Court declined to decide specifically whether a
breach of a union's duty of fair representation constituted a section 8(b) unfair labor practice,' 49 though the National Labor Relations Board and the
lower federal courts had already so held."50 Such a decision was unnecessary
to the Court's holding. The National Labor Relations Act gave the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of unfair
labor practice proceedings.' 5' Under the federal preemption doctrine of San
Diego Building Trades v. Garmon,'"1 neither federal nor state courts have
jurisdiction over suits directly involving activity arguably protected by section
7 or prohibited by section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.'"
Although the question of whether a union has breached its duty of fair
representation at least arguably falls within the scope of the National Labor
Relations Board and, therefore, federal court jurisdiction would seemingly be
preempted by Garmon, the Garmon preemption doctrine has not been applied inflexibly." 4 Other laws have been permitted to come into potential
conflict with the National Labor Relations Act where regulation was over a
matter of particularly local import' 5 or over matters of merely peripheral
concern to the National Labor Relations Act.' 5"
148. See text accompanying note 324 infra.
149. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186. Indeed, the Court has never expressly done so. Del Costello v.
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983); United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67-68 (1981)
(Stewart, J., con:urring); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964).
150. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) rev'd, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963) (violation of §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2)); Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.),
147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (violation of §§ 8(b)(l)(A), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(3)). Since Vaca, the
Board and courts have continued to hold breaches of duty of fair representation to be an unfair
labor practice. E.g., Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1980); H.O. Canfield Rubber Co.,
223 N.L.R.B. 832 (1976); Automobile Plating Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1968); Fanning, The
Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1978).
151. Garner v. Teamsters Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953).
152. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
153. Id. at 245; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179. As recently as last term, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed this type of preemption analysis. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc.,
106 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1986). The Supreme Court has actually developed two separate lines of
labor preemption analysis: Garmon preemption, which is at issue here, and Machinists preemption. The latter takes its name from the Supreme Court's decision in Machinists Lodge 76 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). Machinists preemption
prevents states from regulating where Congress neither protected nor prohibited the activity by
the National Labor Relations Act, but where Congress intended the area to be free from regulation. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395, 1398 (1986).
154. The Court's preemption decisions show "little interest in logical consistency and less interest in building a coherent and continuing body of law." Cox, Recent Developments in Federal
Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 300 (1980).
155. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978) (trespass); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation).
156. E.g., I.ntrnational Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (internal union
matters).
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In holding that the NLRB's unfair labor practice proceedings did not
preempt the judicially created duty of fair representation, the Court in Vaca
reasoned that the history of the duty of fair representation compelled the
conclusion that it was a federally imposed right."' Next, the Court noted
that the NLRB's MirandaFuel 5' decision found that section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act encompassed the duty of fair representation,
thereby raising the possibility of preemption under Garmon.1'9 However, the
Court disagreed with this extrapolation from the Miranda Fuel decision,
declaring that the purpose of the Garmon preemption doctrine was to avoid
conflicting rules of law, remedies, and administration in the labor area. 160
The Court concluded that Congress gave the Board exclusive jurisdiction
over administrating and regulating unfair labor practice proceedings on the
rationale that a "multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are dif' 6
ferent rules of substantive law.' , '
From that conclusion, the Court discussed the exemptions to exclusive
Board jurisdiction expressly provided in the National Labor Relations Act' 62
and those exceptions judicially created.' 63 The exceptions demonstrated to
the Court that preemption was dependent upon the nature of the interests
asserted and their effect on the administration of national labor relations
policy. 6 The Court believed that such considerations did not operate to
preempt the duty of fair representation.
The Court noted that a primary rationale for Garmon preemption-avoidance of conflicting substantive rules of law and deferral to the
congressionally created expert administrative agency-was inapplicable to the
duty of fair representation.' 65 First, the duty-of-fair-representation doctrine
was judicially created and primarily expanded by the courts. 66 Second, the
Board had adopted the standards created by the courts when it eventually
found duty-of-fair-representation breaches to be unfair labor practices. 67
Third, some duty-of-fair-representation allegations concern the negotiation
of collective bargaining agreements and the administration of the grievance

157.
158.
159.
160.

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 178.
Id. at 178-79.

161. Id. at 179 (citing Garner v. Teamsters Union, No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)).
162. Section 303, Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158, 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1947) (federal court jurisdiction for federal damage actions from section 8(b)(4) violations); section 301, National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (federal court jurisdiction
over suits for breaches of collective bargaining agreements); section 701(a), Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 53 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (amending National
Labor Relations Act § 14; state court jurisdiction over labor disputes where the Board has
declined jurisdiction). See also Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179-80.
163. See supra cases at notes 155-56.

164. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 180.
165. Id.at 180-81 (emphasis added).
166. Id.at 181.
167. Id.
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process, matters not normally within the Board's unfair labor practice
jurisdiction.' 6 Therefore,'the Court reasoned that the Board had no experof the subject matter and the
tise to which the Court should defer because
69
Board's lack of experience in this area.'

In the context of federal civil service labor relations, the same considerations apply and should operate to preclude preemption. Until the passage of

the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978, there existed no independent expert administrative agency to handle duty-of-fair-representation complaints. The
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) was first organized in 1978.170 It
was designed as a direct parallel to the National Labor Relations Board'",
and was given jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.'" Thus, the FLRA
could not have had expertise in handling duty-of-fair-representation complaints at the time the CRSA was passed.
Further, the long history of federal court duty-of-fair-representation cases
has not been ignored in the federal sector'1 3 and, in fact, has traditionally
served as a guideline for administrative determinations.'" 4 Indeed, the
primacy of federal court standards in the area has been so entrenched as to
shut out conflicting rules by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. For example, section 7114(a)(1) of the CSRA mandates nondiscrimination by an exclusive bargaining representative.'" 5 In National Treasury Employees Union
v. FLRA, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Federal Labor Relations Authority's construction of section 7114(a)(1) in the context of an unfair labor practice relating to the union's duty of fair representation. " 6 In
that case, the Authority had used Vaca and Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines,'"
another federal private sector duty-of-fair-representation case, as precedent

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105 (1982).
171. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 92-93. See H.R. REP. No. 1403,
supra note 10, a: 41.
172. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(g) (1982).
173. See infra notes 177-180.
174. E.g., AFGE Local 987 (Nedra Bradley), 3 F.L.R.A. 715, 720-21 (1980); NTEU (Fed'l
Election Conim.), 18 F.L.R.A. 299 (1985).
175. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1982). This provision of the CSRA has sometimes been
held to be an embodiment of the duty of fair representation. The few courts who have spoken on
this topic are split as to where, if at all, the Civil Service Reform Act provides for a statutory
duty of fair representation. Two courts have stated that section 7114(a)(1) is the source of that
duty. National Treas. Empls. Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Warren,
764 F.2d at 1:196. Another has assumed it arguendo. NTEU v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402, 1406 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Ho%%ever, the Tenth Circuit has expressly stated that section 7114(a)(1) is not the
source of thal duty. Pham, 799 F.2d at 639. Rather, it is imposed, as in the private sector, by the
latitude of the labor relations statutory scheme. Id. at 637. Accord Karahalios v. Defense Lang.
Inst. Foreign Laag. Center, 534 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (Karahalios1). This confusion is not surprising, given the evolution of the duty of fair representation in the private sector. See supra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
176. 721 F.2d 1402, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
177. 634 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
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to determine the standards for an unfair labor practice breach of the duty of
fair representation under the Civil Service Reform Act.' 78
So dominant are private sector federal court cases in the duty-of-fairrepresentation area, that when the FLRA interpreted section 7114(a)(1) inconsistently with private labor relations court precedent, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Authority's finding of
an unfair labor practice.'" The court held the inconsistent interpretation was
precluded by private sector duty-of-fair-representation standards. 80
Therefore, as in Vaca,' 8 ' the Garmon fear of conflicting interpretations of
substantive law and deferral to Board expertise seem to be inappropriate concerns in the federal sector.
Next, the Supreme Court in Vaca noted that the unique interests served by
the duty of fair representation foreclosed preemption. 8 2 The duty of fair
representation sprang from the congressionally created power of unions to
act as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees. 8 " Consequently,
the rights of individual union members are necessarily subordinated to those
of the union itself.'" Thus, when the union is given control over the collective bargaining agreement and its grievance processes, the duty of fair
representation serves to protect against arbitrary union conduct directed at
8
individuals within the bargaining unit left without other means of redress.'1
The Court in Vaca was specifically concerned about the unreviewable discretion of the Board's General Counsel to refuse to initiate an unfair labor practice complaint," 6 leaving employees without an impartial method of review.
In the federal sector, the union also controls the collective bargaining
grievance systems. Additionally, the General Counsel of the FLRA has
analogous powers and the same discretion to issue an unfair labor practice
complaint under the Civil Service Reform Act as the NLRB General Counsel
has in the private sector. "The decision whether to issue a complaint is entirely within the General Counsel's discretion and is not subject to judicial
review."' "7 Thus, the considerations the Court found in Vaca to foreclose
178. NTEU, 721 F.2d at 1407.
179. NTEU, 800 F.2d 1165, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
180. Id. at 1168. Indeed, so strong is private sector duty-of-fair-representation precedent that
the FLRA, in its brief before the D.C. Circuit, sought to bring its interpretation of section
7114(a)(1) within applicable federal court decisions. Brief for the FLRA at 15 n.10, NTEU, 800
F.2d at 1172 n.6.
181. See supra notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
182. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 181-82.
183. Id. at 182.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 182-83. Under the National Labor Relations Act, the General Counsel has complete discretion to process or drop an unfair labor practice complaint. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138-39 (1975); Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 301 U.S. 41, 49 (1938).
187. Martel v. Carroll, 562 F. Supp. 443, 444 (D. Mass. 1983).
Under subsection (a)(1) the sole responsibility for investigating a charge rests with
the General Counsel of the Authority. If, after investigation, the General Counsel
determines that a complaint should issue, he is required to cause the complaint to
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preemption of private sector duty-of-fair-representation suits should also apply to duty-of-fair-representation suits in the federal sector.
As in the National Labor Relations Act, under the CSRA, the negotiated
collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures are the preferred
mechanism for the resolution of disputes. However, disputes that allege unfair labor practices may also be resolved through that machinery.' 88 Unique
to the federal sector, however, is an exception to exclusivity in limited circumstances. 8"'
In the case of grievances over performance appraisal systems, 9 0 certain
be served upon the charged agency or labor organization. The General Counsel's
decision as to whether a complaint should issue shall not be subject to review.
Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 52 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Senate
Report states:
The General Counsel is intended to be autonomous in investigating unfair labor
practice complaints, in making "final decisions" as to which cases to prosecute
before the Authority .... Specifically, the Authority would neither direct the
General Counsel concerning which unfair labor practice cases to prosecute nor
review the General Counsel's determinations not to prosecute.
S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 102; Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Martel, 562 F. Supp. at 444.
188. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d) (1982).
189. (d)An aggrieved employee affected by a prohibited personnel practice under section 2302(b)(1) of this title which also falls under the coverage of the negotiated
grievance procedure may raise the matter under a statutory procedure or the
negotiated procedure, but not both. An employee shall be deemed to have exercised his option under this subsection to raise the matter under either a statutory
procedure or the negotiated procedure at such time as the employee timely initiates
an action under the applicable statutory procedure or timely files a grievance in
writing, in accordance with the provisions of the parties' negotiated procedure,
whichever event occurs first. Selection of the negotiated procedure in no manner
prejudices the right of an aggrieved employee to request the Merit Systems Protection Board to review the final decision pursuant to section 7702 of this title in the
case of any personnel action that could have been appealed to the Board, or where
applicable, to request the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to review a
final decision in any other matter involving a complaint of discrimination of the
type prohibited by any law administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commi isicn.
(e)(1) Matters covered under sections 4303 [performance appraisal systems] and
7512 [adverse actions] of this title which also fall within the coverage of the
negotialed grievance procedure may, in the discretion of the aggrieved employee,
be raised either under the appellate procedures of section 7701 of this title or under
the negotiated grievance procedure, but not both. Similar matters which arise
under other personnel systems applicable to employees covered by this chapter
may, in the discretion of the aggrieved employee, be raised either under the appellate procedures, if any, applicable to those matters, or under the negotiated
grievance procedure, but not both. An employee shall be deemed to have exercised
his option under this subsection to raise a matter either under the applicable appellate procedures or under the negotiated grievance procedure at such time as the
employee tmely files a notice of appeal under the applicable appellate procedures
or timely fles a grievance in writing in accordance with the provisions of parties'
negotiated grievance procedure, whichever event occurs first.
Id. § 7121(d) and (e).
190. Id. § 4303.
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dismissals or reductions in grade or pay,191 or complaints alleging discrimination based on race, color, sex, age, religion, handicap, or political
affiliation,' 92 an employee has the option of pursuing either the negotiated
procedure or a statutory one leading to an appeal before the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB).' 93 Each procedure is exclusive, although an appeal from the negotiated arbitration system can be taken to the MSPB.'19
Thus, a grievance can always be handled by the negotiated arbitration procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. If the grievance constitutes an
unfair labor practice, that procedure also may be available. 195 Finally, in

limited circumstances, the employee may elect to appeal directly to the
MSPB. This last option is not provided by the National Labor Relations Act,

but it does not resolve the concerns articulated by the Court in Vaca about
the need for independent judicial review.
First, appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board is available only in a
restricted class of cases. 96 Second, the practical nature of an MSPB decision
regarding adverse agency action is something less than the ideal of independent judicial review. 97 Indeed, the MSPB and its jurisprudence "reveal a
marked disposition to circumscribe the protections afforded federal
employees."' ' 9 The formal, adversarial nature of the process stands in sharp
contrast to the negotiated procedures under the collective bargaining agreement.199 Further, the employee was represented by his or her union in approximately 25 percent of the cases appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board. 20 Thus, the same potential for union abuse is present here as in the
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 2"'

191. Id. § 7512.
192. Id. § 2302(b)(1).
193. Id. § 7121(e)(1).
194. Id.; Pham, 799 F.2d at 637.
195. However, the procedure is not available if the matter is appealable to the Merit System
Protection Board. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d) (1982); Comment, Federal Sector Arbitration
Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 17 S.D.L. REV. 857, 867 (1980).
196. See supra notes 190-192. Both the Board and those appellate courts that have reviewed
the issue have construed the Board's grant of authority in a very limited fashion. E.g.,
Mastriano v. Federal Aviation Admin., 714 F.2d 1152, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Perez v. Army &
Air Force Exch. Serv., 680 F.2d 778, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Piskadlo v. Veteran's Admin. Merit
Sys. Protection Bd., 668 F.2d 82 (1st Cir. 1982). See generally, Developments, supra note 12, at
1636-37.
197. Developments, supra note 12, at 1636.
198. Id. Further, a 1980 survey stated that civil service employees were "generally ignorant"
of their statutory protections and without much confidence in those procedures of which they
were aware. See OFFICE

OF

MERIT SYs. REVIEW & STUDIES,

U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECrION BD.,

BREAKING TRUST: PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 5,

18-26 (1982).

199. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 1201.71-75 (1986) (adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model for Board practice and adopting discovery procedures guided by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.).
200. OFFICE OF MERIT SYs. REVIEW & STUDIES, U.S. MSPB, STUDY OF MERIT SYSTEMS PRO-

1980, at 40 (1981).
201. See, e.g., Pham, 799 F.2d 634. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the facts of that

TECTION BOARD APPEALS DECISIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR

case.
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Third, the scope of MSPB review of agency decisions, while appearing independent, :2 has in fact given wide deference to management personnel decisions. 213 The Civil Service Reform Act empowered federal agencies to
discipline public employees not only for "cause," 2 ' but merely for inadequate performance,2 5 as long as discipline is supported by "substantial
evidence. ' 20 6 This has been interpreted by the Merit Systems Protection
Board to mandate upholding the employer/agency decision as long as a
reasonable person could agree with that action.20 7 Thus, the Merit Board's

deferential posture necessarily limits the extent to which the Board serves the
rights-vindicating function envisioned by its proponents.200

Finally, although the Merit Systems Protection Board has wide remedial
powers granted to it by the Civil Service Reform Act,20 9 it has shown reluctance under the present administration to exercise its authority broadly. 210
Further, the Board has consistently held that it is without power to award
back pay for violations of a Board order by a federal agency. 2", This limitation of remedies is particularly inappropriate for a review procedure if it is to
serve the independent oversight function of protecting an employee against
breaches of the duty of fair representation. Therefore, even in those limited
situations where the union-controlled negotiated grievance procedure is not
exclusive, an employee's independent rights may not be adequately protected

202. The Merit Systems Protection Board review is through a hearing (5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)
(1982)) before which discovery may be had (5 C.F.R. § 1201.71-75 (1986)) and witnesses subpoenaed (5 C.F.F;. § 1205(b)(2)(a) (1986); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.81 (1986)).
203. DevelGpments, supra note 12, at 1638-40 and cases cited therein.
204. "Cause" is the traditional civil service standard for employee discipline. E.g., Exec.
Order No. 101 (1897), reprinted in 18 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMN ANNUAL REPORT 282 (1902)
(President McKinley); Exec. Order No. 173 (1902), reprinted in 19 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N
ANNUAL REPCRT 76 (President McKinley); Exec. Order No. 362 (1905), reprinted in 22 U.S.
CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 71 (1905) (President T. Roosevelt); Exec. Order No.
1471 (1912), reprintedin 29 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT 132-33 (1913) (President Taft); Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982)).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(6) (1982).
206. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(A) (1982) provides for the "substantial evidence" test for personnel decisions under 5 U.S.C. § 4303. Otherwise, the "preponderance of the evidence" test is
to be used. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B).
207. Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 M.S.P.B. 489, 492 (1980). Accord 5 C.F.R. §
1201.56 (c)(1) (1986).
208. Develooments, supra note 12, at 1640.
209. 5 U.S.C. § 1205(a)(2) (1982) ("The Merit System Protection Board shall-order any
Federal agency or employee to comply with any order or decision issued by the Board under the
authority granted under paragraph (1) of this subsection and enforce compliance with any such
order.").
210. Developments, supra note 12, at 1641. Accord Miguel v. Department of the Army, 727
F.2d 1081, 1083-84 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
211. E.g., Allen v. Department of the Navy, 1982 Fed. Merit Sys. Rep. (LRP) 5449; Solga
v. Department of the Army, 1982 Fed. Merit Sys. Rep. (LRP) 5359; Ritchey v. United States
Postal Serv., 1982 Fed. Merit Sys. Rep. (LRP)
5161; Strickland v. Veterans Admin., 5
M.S.P.B. 517, 518 (1981); Bradford v. Department of the Army, 3 M.S.P.B. 115, 115 (1980).
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by either of the two administrative avenues of redress.21 " Thus, the Supreme
Court's desire in Vaca to protect impartial review of employee claims by
breaches is equally
federal district court suits for duty-of-fair-representation
3
applicable to federal government employees."
The Supreme Court in Vaca also articulated some preliminary guidelines
for when the duty of fair representation litigant should be excused from exhausting his or her internal collectively bargained-for procedures."" Since
those guidelines concern situations in which a union or employer can effectively stymie the internal systems or otherwise render them futile, 1 these
same guidelines arguably should also apply to the federal sector collective
bargaining agreement.
To conclude, the long expertise of federal courts in duty-of-fairrepresentation suits has served as a model for substantive interpretation of
that duty. That model has been used both by the courts dealing with issues
under the Civil Service Reform Act and by the nine-year-old Federal Labor
Relations Authority. Thus, any fears of inconsistent determinations or inadequate expertise by the federal courts are unfounded.
Further, as in the private sector, the administrative mechanisms of the
Civil Service Reform Act-the unfair labor practice procedures of the FLRA
and the statutory appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board-contain inadequate safeguards for individual interests when they clash with collective
ones. Therefore, the considerations that led the Supreme Court in Vaca to
exempt duty-of-fair-representation suits from preemption by the National
Labor Relations Act should apply with equal force to lawsuits for breaches
of that duty in the federal government employee sector." 6
III. FederalDuty-of-Fair-RepresentationCases: Warren, Pham, and
Their Predecessors
Judicial objections to federal court cognizance of duty of fair representation suits have taken two distinct approaches. One argument is typified by
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Warren v.
Local 1759, AFGE,717 which argues that the absence of a corollary in the
212. MSPB: see supra text accompanying notes 188-212; FLRA: see supra text accompanying
notes 166-180, 187. See also Broida, FairRepresentationfor FederalEmployees: An Overview,
30 FED. BAR NEws & J. 440, 442 (1983) (FLRA enforces the duty of fair representation through
unfair labor practice mechanisms less forcefully than the NLRB). In other public employee contexts, the negotiated procedure offers union representation, finality, and a perception of more
impartiality. See Heyford & Pegnetter, Grievance Arbitrationfor Public Employees: A Comparison of Rights, Arbitration and Civil Service Appeals Procedures,4 ARB. J. 22, 27 (Sept.
1980); Pegnetter & Heyford, State Employee Grievancesand Due Process:An Analysis of Contract Arbitration and Civil Service Review Systems, 29 S.C.L. REv. 305, 328-30 (1978).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 182-186.
214. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183-186.
215. Id. See also Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981).
216. Note, Public Sector GrievanceProcedures,Due Process, and the Duty of FairRepresentation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 752, 782-85 (1976).
217. 764 F.2d 1395 (llth Cir. 1985).
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Civil Service Reform Act to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act 2 8 bars federal jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation suits. 1 9 The
second argument is articulated by the Federal District Court for Rhode
Island in Tucker v. Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic
Center. 22 Tucker infers a Garmon-type preemption 221 from the comprehensive nature of the Civil Service Reform Act.22 2 A close examination of Warren, Tucker, and related cases show that they are in error.
Warren v. Local 1759, AFGE
Warren was a civilian employee of the army represented by Local 1759 of
the American Federation of Government Employees, although he was not a
union member. 223 The army suspended him twice based upon allegations of
misconduct. He challenged both suspensions through the bargained-for
grievance procedure. 224 Despite his requests, the union refused to take Warren's grievance to arbitration. 22 1 Warren then filed unfair labor practice
charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which, after investigation, refused to issue complaints. 226 Warren appealed to the Federal Labor
Relations Authority General Counsel who
affirmed the union's refusal to in227
itiate unfair labor practice proceedings.
Warren finally filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia alleging that his union had breached its duty of
fair representation by refusing to initiate unfair labor practice proceedings on
his behalf merely because he was not a union member. 228 The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding that general federal question jurisdiction
under section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code229 was not permissible since the Federal230Labor Relations Authority had exclusive jurisdiction
over Warren's claim.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act
governed federal employee labor relations. 2"' The court stated that section32
7114(a)(1) of the CSRA explicitly codified the duty of fair representation.
218. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
219. See sujpra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
220. 607 F. Supp. 1232 (D.R.I. 1985).
221. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
223. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1395-96.
224. Id. at 1395.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1396.
229. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." (As
amended July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415 (1958); Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976); Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980)).
230. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1397.
231. Id. at 139g.
232. Id. For the text of CSRA § 7114(a)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1982), see supra text at
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Thus, the court reasoned, a violation of section 7114(a)(1) would be an un-

fair labor practice under sections 7116(b)(1) and (8).233 Since the Civil Service
Reform Act gives the Federal Labor Relations Authority exclusive jurisdic-

tion over unfair labor practices,23 ' the court concluded2 3 5that the federal
district courts were preempted from hearing such matters.

The Warren court's reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it is not clear
representation 2in
that section 7114(a)(1) does in fact codify the duty of 2fair
37
36
the federal sector. While some courts have so found, others disagree,
stating that like the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations
Act, the duty of fair representation in the Civil Service Reform Act is implied
from the general statutory grant of exclusive representative status.2 38 As
23 9
discussed earlier, the legislative history is silent on this issue.

Second, despite the decision in Warren, whether the Civil Service Reform
Act does in fact codify the duty of fair representation is not dispositive of the
issue of jurisdiction. Warren reasoned that federal court jurisdiction over
duty-of-fair-representation suits was preempted because that duty was
codified by section 7114(a)(1), thereby making it an unfair labor practice enforceable exclusively by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. This is the

same Garmon-type preemption analysis that the United States Supreme
Court in Vaca held did not mandate preemption. Vaca is equally applicable
to the federal sector and, therefore, federal court jurisdiction should not be
240

foreclosed.

Further, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the CSRA only permitted federal
court action in three instances: review in the court of appeals of Federal
Labor Relations Authority final orders; 24' enforcement in the court of ap-

note 65. The courts have disagreed as to whether section 7114(a)(1) is in fact the statutory
codification of the duty of fair representation. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
233. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(1982) states in pertinent part:
(b) For the purposes of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
organization-l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise
by the employee of any right under this chapter; . . .(8) to otherwise fail or refuse
to comply with any provision of this chapter.
See, e.g., National Fed'n Fed. Empls., Local 1453, 23 F.L.R.A. 686 (1986).
234. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105, 7118 (1982).
235. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1397.
236. Id. at 1399; NTEU, 800 F.2d at 1168-71.
237. Pham, 799 F.2d at 639. Accord NTEU, 721 F.2d at 1403, 1406 (statutory duty was in
fact the duty of fair representation).
238. Pham, 799 F.2d at 637, 639. This interpretation is more closely akin to the analysis under
the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Act. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177; Steele, 323 U.S. at
202; Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663,
807-08 (1973). In any event, the majority status of the union serves as the basis for the duty of
fair representation. Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 342; Steele, 323 U.S. at 198. A minority union has
no duty of fair representation. Wells v. Railway Conductors, 442 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1971),
1970).
aff'g 308 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ill.
239. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 170-187 and accompanying text.
241. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1982).
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peals of FLRA orders upon petition by the Authority; 24 2 temporary injunctive relief by a federal district court when the FLRA so requests upon the
finding of an unfair labor practice. 24 3 The court concluded by negative implication that because of this limited statutory grant of jurisdiction, the
244
federal courts were without power to assert jurisdiction in all other cases.
In so holding, the court relied on NationalFederationof FederalEmployees,
Local 1263 v. Commandant National Defense Institute24 and Columbia
Power Trades Council v. United States Department of Energy.24 6 However,
both of those cases dealt with factual and legal situations distinguishable
from the enforcement of duty-of-fair-representation suits.
NFFE was a lawsuit brought by a union to compel the federal agency to
bargain with it over the impact of a proposed reduction in force. 247 This type
of lawsuit is distinguishable from a duty-of-fair-representation complaint
because it falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, which had refused to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. 24' The scope of bargining was a major concern of Congress,24 9 which
specifically placed that issue under the control of the administrative
agency, 250 thereby preempting federal court jurisdiction. Thus, the court's
decision in NFFE was a classic example of Garmon-type preemption, which
the Supreme Court in Vaca held inapplicable to duty-of-fair-representation
suits.",
Similarly, Columbia Power Trades involved a union attempt to compel2 a2
writ of martdanus against an employer to implement an arbitration award. 1
As in NFFE, the issue revolved around the scope of bargaining authority in
the federal government. 213 Once again, the court used a Garmon-type
preemption analysis to find sole power in the Federal Labor Relations
Authority to resolve disputes constituting unfair labor practices in the federal
sector. 2 "1These cases, therefore, are inapposite to the issue of whether the
CSRA preempted federal court jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation

242. Id. § 7123(b).
243. Id. § 7123(d).
244. See J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.24 (4th ed. 1972). See, e.g., Tucker,
607 F. Supp. at 1239.
245. 493 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1980). The court also relied upon Yates, 533 F. Supp. 461
(D.D.C. 1982). Preemption of federal court jurisdiction was based upon the absence in the Civil
Service Reform Act of a parallel to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The
plaintiffs in Yates filed untimely grievances with their employer and then sought to overturn in
court the agency's denial of their complaint. Id. at 462.
246. 671 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1982).
247. NFFE, 493 F. Supp. at 677.
248. Id. at 678.
249. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1982).
251. See supra notes 157-169, 182-186.
252. Columbia Power Trades, 671 F.2d at 325-26.
253. Id.at 326 n.2.
254. Id.at 327.
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suits because the issues involved were clearly and consciously placed by the
Civil Service Reform Act within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FLRA.
Despite its supposed reliance on NFFE and Columbia Power Trades, the
real rationale upon which the court of appeals based its decision was the
absence of a section 301 parallel in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act grants federal court
jurisdiction over breaches of collective bargaining agreements by employers
or by unions. 2" That section is more than jurisdictional; it permits the
federal courts to fashion a federal common law of labor relations.256
Moreover, because it is an express grant of jurisdiction, section 301 has been
held not to be preempted by the National Labor Relations Board's exclusive
power over unfair labor practices.2 57 Section 301 has, therefore, been a
jurisdictional foundation for private sector duty-of-fair-representation suits
2
also alleging a breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer. 11
It is not, however, the sole jurisdictional basis for such suits. As the Supreme
Court in Del Costello v. Teamsters noted, suits against the union are based
upon the interstices of federal law implied from the National Labor Relations
Act.2 59 Warren itself recognized that federal jurisdiction of private sector
duty-of-fair-representation suits could be based upon section 1337 of title 28
of the United States Code. 260 Alternatively, another possible jurisdictional
26
basis might be section 1331 of the Code. '
Despite possible jurisdiction under sections 1331 and 1337 for private sector duty-of-fair-representation suits, the court in Warren held there was no
federal jurisdiction over similar federal sector suits. Instead, where a breach
of the collective bargaining agreement is alleged in federal sector duty-offair-representation cases, the lack of a section 301 analogue completely ousts

255. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1982). See generally Sovern, Section 301 and the

Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1963).
256. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
257. Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962).
258. Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164.
259. Id. See infra cases at notes 285-287.
260. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1398 (citing Smith v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers, 500 F.2d 741,
748 (5th Cir. 1974) and Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878, 882-883 (5th Cir. 1974)). 28 U.S.C. §
1337(a) (1982) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies: Provided, however, That the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of an action brought under section 11707 of
title 49, only if the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill of lading exceeds
$10,000, exclusive of interests and costs.

(Emphasis in original.)
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). See, e.g., Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964). See also Walsh v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 523
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (no section 301 analogue means no federal court jurisdiction over suit to compel enforcement of arbitration award and collective bargaining agreement under 28 U.S.C. §

1331).
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federal court jurisdiction. 262 The Eleventh Circuit based its holding on the
fact that the House version of the Civil Service Reform Act provided for
federal court jurisdiction for ordering arbitration pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. 263 That provision was struck from the final version of
the CSRA, 21' thereby implicitly precluding federal court jurisdiction.
Although section 301 grants federal court jurisdiction over suits to compel
arbitration, 215 that section is considerably broader in its language 66 and
focus than the proposed section 7121(c). 267 Moreover, as already discussed,
the legislative history of proposed section 7121(c) does not support the
Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that its excision from the final version of the
2 68
Civil Service Reform Act precluded federal court jurisdiction.
Additionally, lawsuits by unions or employers to compel conformity with
the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement raise different concerns than do duty-of-fair-representation suits. The enforcement of
a collective bargaining agreement to compel arbitration frequently entails an
examination of the provisions of the agreement itself.2 69 Deferral of these
questions to the administrative agency familiar with the particular contours
of the scope of bargaining and arbitration in the federal sector seems appropriate, especially since the two principal actors, unions and employers,
are powerful enough to have their voices heard in the administrative
forum. 270 Duty-of-fair-representation suits, on the other hand, stem from an
opposite premise: specifically, that the collective bargaining system and ad-

ministrative procedures do not adequately protect the interests of the individual when they diverge from the principal actors. 271
262. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1398-99; Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1240. Accord Yates, 533 F. Supp.
at 462 (federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) preempted by the Civil Service Reform
Act-no parallel to § 301). Cf. Pham, 799 F.2d at 638-39; Naylor, 727 F.2d at 1103; Karahalios
I, 534 F. Supp. at 1206-07; Karahalios v. Defense Lang. Inst., 544 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (Karahatios1).
263. H.R. R.P. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 286; H.R. 11280, supra note 65, § 7121(c).
264. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 157.
265. E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
266. Compare H.R. 11280, supra note 65, § 7121(c) with 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
267. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (section 301 must be given broad
interpretation); Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass'n v. Painters & Decorators Jt. Comm. of
East Bay Counties, 707 F.2d 1067, reh. denied, 717 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 927 (1984) (section 301 must be given broad interpretation); Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978) (section 301 encompasses not only suits between
employers and 'anions, but also suits by individual employees to vindicate uniquely personal
rights); Malta v. Killeen, 465 F. Supp. 471 (D. Pa. 1979) (same).
268. See supra notes 106-125 and accompanying text.
269. E.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. United Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702
(1982); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); United Steel Workers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 554 (1960).
270. See5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7116(b)(7), 7117 (1982); NFFE,493 F. Supp. at 679. See generally
Developments, supra note 12, at 1611.
271. See supra notes 130-132, 185-186 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in the private sector, binding arbitration is viewed as the quid pro
quo for the no-strike clause, 72 and orders to compel arbitration may be tied
to no-strike provisions.1 73 In the public sector, compulsory arbitration2 74 has
engendered nearly as much controversy as the right to strike." 5 Both compulsory arbitration of grievances and the use of the strike weapon are treated
differently in the private and public sectors2 76 due to the difference of opinion as to the special nature of public employee labor relations. 7 7 Given the
heated debate over these issues, it is rather surprising that neither the inclusion nor deletion of H.R. 11280, section 7121(c) elicited any comments in
either legislative body.2 78 Nevertheless, the eventual removal of this provision
may simply reflect a policy choice by Congress
to defer these questions to the
2 79
administrative body created to handle them.
Thus, although the court in Warren speaks about the express rejection of a
section 301 counterpart in the Civil Service Reform Act as implying a conscious denial of federal court jurisdiction over federal sector duty-of-fairrepresentation suits, 2 810 the appropriateness of that inference is open to question. This is especially true given the quite different and limited scope of the
proposed provision and congressional silence as to its existence.
Even if the removal of H.R. 11280, section 7121(c) implied a withdrawal
of federal court jurisdiction over suits for breaches of collective bargaining
agreements in the federal employee sector, the further extrapolation that
Warren makes from that implication is also flawed. The Warren court
assumes that because Congress did not provide jurisdiction over collective

272. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
273. E.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
274. E.g., P.

STAUDOHAR,

GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

(1977); Craver,

The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector GrievanceArbitration, 58 TEX. L. REV. 329 (1980);
Baird & McArthur, ConstitutionalDue Processand the Negotiation of Grievance Proceduresin
Public Employment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 209 (1976); Dempsey & Cahn, Is Public Sector Grievance
ArbitrationDifferent from the PrivateSector: A Union Perspective,7 J.L. & EDUC.555 (1978);
Smith & Wood, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: A "Perfect" Order?, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 855 (1980).
275. E.g., Anderson, Strikes: An Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 943 (1969); Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequencesof Strikes by PublicEmployees,
79 YALE L.J. 419 (1969); Cole, PublicEmployee Strikes-The Law and PossibleAlternatives, 11
CUMBERLAND L. REV. 315 (1980); Olsen, The Use of the Legal Right to Strike in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J. 494 (1982); Wohlers, An EndangeredSpecies, The FederalEmployee Strike, 19
IDAHO L. REV. 7 (1983).
276. Compare CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1982) with NLRA §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5) and 158(b)(3) (1982) (duty to bargain). Compare CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) (1982)
with NLRA §§ 7 and 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158 (1982) (legitimacy of the strike weapon). See
Aaron, supra note 10, at 1098-1103, 1109-18.
277. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
279. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 157. See also, CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §

7117(c); Department of Defense, 659 F.2d at 1146-47.
280. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1397-98. One court has stated that the deletion of section 7121(c)

merely shows intent not to permit injunctive relief in the district courts, not intent to prohibit
damage actions. KarahaliosI1,
544 F. Supp. at 80.
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bargaining contract breaches, all duty-of-fair-representation suits are
barred.2 8' This assumption appears to be based upon two premises: (1) that
section 301 is the true basis for duty-of-fair-representation suits in the private
section;2 82 and (2) that its finding that section 7114(a)(1) of the Civil Service
Reform Act is the embodiment of the duty of fair representation in the
283
federal sector distinguishes private labor relations law precedent.
The first premise ignores the fact that section 301 has never been the sole
24
basis for federal court jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation suits.
In Del Costello, the United States Supreme Court stated that private sector
duty-of-fair-representation suits comprised two distinct causes of action: one
against the employer based on section 301 and the other against the union
based on the implied general federal question jurisdiction garnered from the
intersection of federal labor statutes. 28 Thus, the suit against the union is not
dependent on section 301 for its jurisdictional foundation. An employee may
sue either the employer or the union or both. 286 This is consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Vaca:
[W]e held [in Vaca] that an action seeking damages for injury inflicted by a breach of a union's duty of fair representation was
judicially cognizable in any event, that is, even if the conduct
complained of was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and whether or not the lawsuit was
287
bottomed on a collective agreement.
Even assuming there is no federal court jurisdiction against the federal
agency, there is no reason to prohibit a duty-of-fair-representation suit by an
employee against his or her union. The Tenth Circuit in Pham speculated
that by the removal of proposed H.R. 11280 section 7121(c), Congress was
specifically drawing a distinction between duty-of-fair-representation suits
against the unions and those against the federal agency-the latter being subject to sovereign immunity. 288 The court in Pham reasoned that the deletion
of proposed section 7121(c) merely meant that Congress was not consenting
to suits against the federal government. By immunizing the government
against duty-of-fair-representation suits, Congress did not also intend to insulate labor unions from such suits.2 89
281. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399.
282. Id. at 1398.
283. Id. at 1399.
284. Although the Railway Labor Act has no equivalent to section 301, duty-of-fairrepresentation suits under the Act are properly heard in the federal courts. E.g., Glover v. St.
L.-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Bagnall v.
Airline Pilots Ass'n, 626 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
285. Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164. Accord Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 224

(1983).
286.
287.
288.
289.

Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 166.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
Pham, 799 F.2d at 639.
Id. at 639.
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The Tenth Circuit argument appears to be pure speculation. Not only is
the legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act silent as to the duty of
fair representation generally, but the specific history of section 7121(c) makes
no mention of intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.2 9 "The House
recedes" probably refers to the narrow issue of Authority dominance in cases
about compulsion of arbitration. 9 To suppose Congress made a conscious
decision not to waive sovereign immunity seems to be clear conjecture.
Nevertheless, the ultimate conclusion of the Tenth Circuit in Pham is sound.
A separate suit against a union may be maintained even if the administrative
agency is immune. " 92
Not only did the Warren court ignore the dual and distinct nature of dutyof-fair-representation claims, it also failed to grapple with the precedent the
court itself cited: that duty-of-fair-representation suits have been premised on
jurisdictional bases other than section 301 .2 3 Recognizing that such suits
have been brought under sections 1331 and 1337 of title 28 of the United
States Code, the court merely stated that in those cases there was only a
union breach of fair representation and no employer violation of the collective bargaining agreement.294 The court implied that in those situations plaintiffs were required to find alternate sources for federal jurisdiction because
295
section 301 was unavailable.
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Warren that because there was no section 301 analogue in the Civil Service Reform Act, there is no federal court
jurisdiction for federal sector duty-of-fair-representation breaches is erroneous. However, far from indicating that without a section 301 jurisdictional base, duty-of-fair-representation suits are not cognizable, the cases
cited in Warren demonstrate the independence of union suits from any cor296
responding breach by an employer.
Similarly, the finding of the court in Warren that section 7114(a)(1) of the
Civil Service Reform Act codified the duty of fair representation, thus making private sector precedent distinguishable, is without merit. 297 Apparently,
the Warren court's unarticulated reasoning is that there is a "qualitative"
difference between statutorily expressed unfair labor practices and those actions interpreted by the administrative agency to be unlawful. 2 9' The implica-

290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
See supra note 116.
See also Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164, 166.
Warren, 764 F.2d at 1398.

294. Id.

295. Id.
296. See also Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164, 166. Two-pronged suits have been permitted
under the Railway Labor Act, which also does not have a parallel to section 301. Glover v. St.
L.-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Bagnall v.
Airline Pilots Ass'n, 626 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981).
297. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399.
298. Obviously, the use of the phrase "expressed unfair labor practice" is somewhat of a
misnomer in this context. Section 7116(b)(8) refers explicitly only to a failure to comply with any
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tion of Warren is that preemption is less appropriate for the former type of
violation than the latter. 2"
There are two defects in the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning on this point.
First, as discussed earlier, °0 it is dubious whether section 7114(a)(1) codifies
the private sector duty of fair representation. Second, and more important,
there is no recognized qualitative difference between expressly stated and administratively interpreted unfair labor practices. 30 '
The Garmon-preemption doctrine implicitly excludes recognition of such
differences. 02 Garmonitself makes no distinction between stated and implied
unfair labor practices.11 3 Instead, Garmon provides that, if proper, the scope
of preemption even reaches activity only arguably prohibited by the
4
NLRA.

30

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Vaca did not draw a
distinction between these two types of unfair labor practices. In fact,
although the Court refused to resolve the issue of whether a breach of the
duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice, 30 - Vaca held
that the duty of fair representation was cognizable in the federal courts even
if the Board also had unfair labor practice jurisdiction.3 0 6
The Court in Vaca does speak of "the NLRB's tardy assumption of
jurisdiction in these cases,' '307 perhaps implying that a more prompt assertion
of Board jurisdiction would have influenced the Court's opinion. However, a
major problem with exclusive Board power over duty-of-fair-representation
suits is the unreviewable nature of the NLRB General Counsel's discretion in
the issuance or denial of an unfair labor practice complaint. 3 ° The General
30 9
Counsel of the FLRA is given the same statutory powers in this regard.
Thus, the Supreme Court's concerns in Vaca should apply with equal force
here in the case of federal sector duty-of-fair-representation suits and
30
mitigate against preemption. 1
Perhaps the court of appeals in Warren was implying that by enacting section 7114(a)(1) Congress made a policy decision favoring the Federal Labor
other provision of the Act. A violation of the duty of fair representation is not itself made an
unfair labor practice.
299. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1399. The Court distinguished the KarahaliosI and Karahalios11
decisions on this point. Id. at 1399 n.5. The Karahaliosdecisions are discussed infra at notes
373-402 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
301. See generally R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 132 (1976); 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW §§ 5.2, 5.4,
5.30 (1968). See also, Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 502, 503 n.2 (1965).
302. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
303. See generally Garmon, 359 U.S. at 236.
304. See id. at 245.
305. Vaca, :186 U.S. at 186.
306. Id. at 173, 186. Indeed, the opinion was written after the Board's assertion of jurisdiction in Miranda Fuel, 140 N.L.R.B. 181. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
307. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 183.
308. Id. at 182-83.
309. CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(1) (1982). See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
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Relations Authority over the courts to resolve duty-of-fair-representation
complaints. Congress could certainly have taken such a position. However,
this inference is a bit strained given the total absence of any legislative history
on this issue31 ' and, especially, given the fact that private sector duty of fair
representation was so clearly enforceable in the courts by 1978.312
Presumably, Congress was aware of the forums available for duty-of-fairrepresentation suits in the private sector and would have expressly stated such
a policy decision." 3
Thus, although the arguments of the Eleventh Circuit in Warren are initially appealing, the analysis of the court is flawed. Both NFFEand Columbia
Power Trades deal with preemption situations distinguishable from duty-offair-representation suits. 31 ' The history of the deletion of H.R. 11280 section
7121(c) is problematic, 3" but there is little reason to believe that the section
was intended to be a congressional decision to preclude duty-of-fairrepresentation suits in federal court." 6 Finally, regardless of whether the
Civil Service Reform Act contains an explicit duty of fair representation in
section 7114(a)(1), 31 7 the resolution of that issue should not affect the ability
of the federal courts to hear duty-of-fair-representation claims in that
318
forum.
Tucker v. Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/TopographicCenter
In Tucker, Tucker sued his employer, the Defense Mapping Agency, and
his union, AFGE, Local 1884, for, among other things, infidelity to the duty
of fair representation. 3' 9 Tucker's claim arose out of a temporary change in
hours of work negotiated between the employer and the union. 320 Tucker
claimed that the change was in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement 32' and alleged separate duty-of-fair-representation claims against
3 2
the agency and the union. 1
The court dismissed the duty-of-fair-representation claims for lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that the comprehensive scheme of the Civil Service
Reform Act operated to preempt those claims. The court began with an ex-

311. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
313. Accord PATCO, 653 F.2d at 1138 ("in interpreting the legislative history of a statute,
there is a presumption that Congress was aware of the judicial construction of existing law"
(citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948)).
314. See supra notes 245-254 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
316. See supra text accompanying note 119.
317. See supra notes 65-75, 236-238 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
319. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1233.
320. Id.
321. Id.at 1237.
322. Id. Although the Tucker court treated the duty-of-fair-representation liability of the
union and the agency separately, the arguments discussed were essentially the same. See id. at
1244 n.9.
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position of Ihe doctrine of preemption,32 3 specifically considering (1) whether
Congress intended the Civil Service Reform Act entirely to occupy the field

of labor relations and (2) whether
the asserted remedies would inhibit the
3 24
purposes or goals of the Act.

The first issue in Tucker was the limited role of the federal courts under
the Civil Service Reform Act. The court described the two statutory avenues
of dispute resolution, negotiated grievance systems and unfair labor practice
proceedings, before the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 2 The court then
concluded that the entire limited role of the federal courts was articulated by
section 7123 of the Civil Service Reform Act, which provided for judicial
review of Federal Labor Relations Authority decisions and orders. 2 6
The Tucker court quoted from the Senate Report to the effect that the
Civil Service Reform Act was a comprehensive reform of the Civil Service. 7
The court next stated that Congress specifically pared down federal court
jurisdiction through the Civil Service Reform Act to minimize decisional
nonuniformity via such suits in federal district court.3 2 As authority, the
court cited a section of the Senate Report dealing specifically with review of
Merit System Protection Board decisions.32 9 However, the court's reasoning
is not persuasive since it relied on congressional legislative history regarding
review of MSPB decisions to support its finding of a similarly limited federal
court role in reviewing FLRA decisions and orders. 30 Nowhere in the Senate
Report 33' or the House-Senate Joint Committee Report 3 2 on review of
FLRA decisions and orders does Congress evince the same fears about
333
federal court jurisdiction.

323. Id. at 1238.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. The Eleventh Circuit made an abbreviated version of this argument in Warren. Warren, 764 F.2d at 1396. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text for an articulation and
criticism of this argument.
327. Tucker, 697 F. Supp. at 1239 (quoting S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 1).
328. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
329. S. REP. N!o. 969, supra note 53, at 63:
Currently employees who wish to challenge Commission decisions generally file
their claims with U.S. District Courts. The number of these courts has caused wide
variations in the kinds of decisions which have been issued on the same or similar
matters. The section remedies the problem by providing that Board decisions and
orders ... be reviewable by the Court of Claims and U.S. Courts of Appeals,
rather than by U.S. District Courts.
330. See CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b) (1982) (procedures to review decisions of the MSPB). The
court in Tucker had been discussing CSRA § 7123 (review of FLRA orders and decisions). See
Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
331. S. REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 102.
332. H.R. COrNF. REP. No. 1717, supra note 67, at 153.
333. Cf. 124 CONG. REC. H9639-40 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Collins).

Representative Collins was apparently the lone congressional voice for these concerns. For a
discussion of his proposal regarding judicial oversight of FLRA orders and the negative congressional response thereto, see supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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In any event, congressional provisions about review of FLRA (or MSPB)
orders and decisions in the court of claims and/or courts of appeals 334 should
not be the basis for excluding federal court jurisdiction under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius(the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another). 3 " Like the CSRA, the NLRA 336 gives the courts of appeals
jurisdiction to review and enforce decisions and orders of the NLRB (upon
which the FLRA was based3 37). Nevertheless, the limited judicial role under
the NLRA did not prevent the Supreme Court in Vaca from recognizing that
the duty of fair representation required judicial enforcement. 3 8 Further, the
fact that the CSRA provided for judicial review of NLRA decisions increases
the judicial role in federal employee labor relations. 3 9 Under the executive
order scheme, decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Counsel were not
3 40
subject to judicial review.
Nor would finding federal court jurisdiction over duty of fair representation be "a formidable barrier to the speedy and efficacious accomplishment
of the salutory objectives of the Civil Service Reform Act." 3 4'' The court in
Tucker distinguished Vaca and the private sector duty-of-fair-representation
jurisprudence by stating that collateral district court jurisdiction would be
counter to the ideals of efficiency in the federal service. 34 2 Once again, the

334. Under the current federal law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the MSPB. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, §§ 127(a)(9), 144, Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(9), 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1982)).
335. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 244, § 47.24.
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1982).
336. NLRA §§ 10(e), (f),
337. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 41. See also Turgeon, 677 F.2d at 938 n.4.
338. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87. In the private sector, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) does not always provide the statutory grant of jurisdiction. Accord Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164-65. See supra notes
285-287, 296.
339. Indeed, a major sponsor of the legislation, Representative Ford, viewed the role of the
courts as a protector of employee rights. Additionally, he saw judicial review as a spur to a more
even-handed enforcement of the Act away from the executive order regime and approaching the
private model.
But if at the beginning or later the Authority refuses to follow its mandate [to
move away from the executive order scheme], we expect courts to vigorously defend the rights of employees and their representatives under Title VII against
misrepresentation or half-hearted enforcement by the Authority.
124 CONo. REc. H13610 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford).
340. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,464 U.S. at 92.
341. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
342. Id. at 1240 n.6, 1244 (citing Martel, 562 F. Supp. at 445).
The district court in Tucker accepted the reasoning of Judge Zobel in Martel. Tucker, 607 F.
Supp. at 1244. Martel concerned an air traffic controller terminated as a result of the illegal
PATCO strike. Martel, 562 F. Supp. at 443. In plaintiff's duty-of-fair-representation claim, he
alleged that his union coerced him into joining the unlawful strike and that his employer failed
to protect him from his union's conduct and had fined him unfairly. Id. at 444. The court found
that Vaca did not apply to plaintiff's claim because: (1) government efficiency prevents judicial
cognizance of duty-of-fair-representation claims, id. at 445, and (2) plaintiff had adequate administrative remedies available by appeal to the MSPB, id. The latter rationale is erroneous
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court has misconstrued the intent of Congress in enacting the Civil Service
Reform Act. Congress was concerned with efficient government and with
streamlining the appeals process. 4 3 Yet, it perceived that efficiency was promoted through strengthening the collective bargaining process.3 44 Efficiency
was intended -o be obtained by protecting employee rights through an enlarged union role in the labor relations scheme and by reducing the traditional civil service administrative remedies.3 4 - With increased union power
came the attending responsibility of the duty of fair representation 34" and the
corresponding need to have these disputes heard in an impartial judicial
347
forum.

The court in Tucker relied heavily on Bush v. Lucas in its analysis of the
comprehensive remedial scheme of the Civil Service Reform Act.3 4 In Bush
the United States Supreme Court denied a non-CSRA, separate cause of action to a federal employee from alleged violations of his first amendment
rights.3 49 Bush had alleged that he had been retaliated against for "whistleblowing.""" The Court declined to create a Bivens-type3 1' remedy given the
3
comprehensive nature of the Civil Service Reform Act. "
The court in. Tucker interpreted Bush to explain the relationship between
section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code (general federal question
jurisdiction) and the Civil Service Reform Act. 3 1 According to the court in
Tucker, Bush effectively held "the detailed remedial structure of CSRA
'preempted' the less specific federal jurisdictional grant under § 1331 ." 31 4
Even accepting this characterization of Bush, the question posed by the
Supreme Court in that decision was not the power to add a new constitutional remedy 3:5 but the appropriatenessof that addition in light of the rele-

because review by the MSPB does not meet the Supreme Court's concern for impartial review
for duty-of-fair-representation breaches. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182. See supra notes 196-211 and
accompanying i.ext.
343. See, e.g., S. REp. No. 969, supra note 53, at 4.
344. E.g., CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1)(B) (1982). See also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms,464 U.S at 91-93, 103, 107.
345. See, e.g., Message of President Carter, Mar. 2, 1978, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1403,
supra note 10, at 102; 124 CONG. REc. H11825 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Lehman). See also supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
346. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186.
347. See KarahaliosI, 534 F. Supp. at 1207-08.
348. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239-41 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)).
349. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.
350. Id. at 369-70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for definition of "whistleblowing."
351. That is, a remedy implied from a violation of constitutional rights despite no express
provision therefor. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Bivens granted a nonstatutory damage award to a plaintiff whose fourth amendment
rights had been violated by federal agents. Id. at 395-96.
352. Bush, 462 U.S. at 390.
353. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1240.
354. Id.
355. The Court clearly has the power to remedy infringement of individual rights even
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vant policy considerations of Congress. 3 6 The Court stated that the issue was
one of "federal personnel policy. ' 357 After tracing the history of civil service
remedies, paying particular attention to employee speech rights, 3 8 the
Supreme Court determined that Congress provided an elaborate system for
the resolution of those disputes. 359 Given the specific congressional policy
decided to defer
decisions with respect to that particular problem, the Court
36 0
to the legislature for the creation of any new remedies.
Nevertheless, Bush does not "virtually mandat[e]" the denial of federal
jurisdiction to duty-of-fair-representation suits by government employees. 361
The problem of employee speech rights had been specifically addressed in
both the general history of civil service reform and in the specific legislative
history of the Civil Service Reform Act.3 62 Indeed, protection of whistleblowers and, thus, the intersection of the first amendment with government
efficiency, constituted one area where Congress gave particular attention to
conflicting policy considerations. 363 Therefore, the Court's deferral in Bush
to those determinations was appropriate.
In contrast, Congress made no specific policy decisions about the duty of
fair representation in the federal sector. 36' As previously discussed, the pattern for federal sector labor relations was the national experience with private
enterprise.3 65 The increased union role in the civil service system implied a need
for the duty-of-fair-representation protection. 366 Further, Bush concerned the
judicial creation of a "neoteric" cause of action.3 67 The duty of fair
representation, on the other hand, has had a long history in the federal
courts under private sector labor jurisprudence.3 68 In passing the Civil Service
Reform Act based on the National Labor Relations Act, Congress should
have specifically indicated where private sector precedents were inap3 69
propriate.

without congressional mandate. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Bivens, 403
U.S. 388. See also, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
356. Bush, 462 U.S. at 373.
357. Id. at 380-81.
358. Id. at 381-86.
359. Id. at 386-88.
360. Id. at 389-90.
361. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1239.
362. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 381-86. See supra note 59.
363. S.REP. No. 969, supra note 53, at 68; H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 386-87
(supplementary view of Rep. Schroeder); 124 CONG. REC. S14303-04 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978).
364. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
367. Tucker, 607 F. Supp. at 1240. The court's tendency toward polysyllabic self-expression
can be seen throughout the opinion. Accord Ferris v. General Dynamics Corp., 645 F. Supp.
1354 (D.R.I. 1986); Heath v. American Sail Training Ass'n, 644 F. Supp. 1459 (D.R.I. 1986);
D'Amario v. Providence Civic Center, 639 F. Supp. 1538 (D.R.I. 1986); Hartman v. City of
Providence, 636 F. Supp. 1395 (D.R.I. 1986); Deborah Leslie, Ltd. v. Rona, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
1250 (D.R.I. 1986).
368. See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
369. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 10, at 377 (supplementary views of Reps. Clay,
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Finally, the 1967 Vaca opinion examined the meshing of the National
Labor Relations Act with the duty of fair representation. In the search for
relevant Supreme Court precedent on the accommodation of that duty with
the comprehensive labor relations statutes, the Vaca opinion seems more
suitable for review than is Bush. The creation of a Bivens-type remedy in the
Civil Service Reform Act for constitutional violations appears only tangentially related to the issue of judicial cognizance of duty-of-fair-representation
suits by federal employees. The Court's Vaca decision, in contrast, dealt with
the same issue except under a different statute. Given the close relationship
10
between the National Labor Relations and the Civil Service Reform acts, 7
Vaca should be the more appropriate precedent.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the authorities and inferences used
by the court in Tucker and Warren are misapplied given the legislative
history and purposes of the Civil Service Reform Act. This is not to suggest,
however, that the opinions in Pham and other cases upholding judicial oversight of duty-of-fair-representation suits are always immune from criticism,
as the following section will show.
Criticism of Supporting Cases
There are four cases supporting the grant of federal subject matter
jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation suits. The Tenth Circuit opinion
in Pham has already been discussed and criticized.3 7' The Federal District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina issued a cursory decision in
Naylor v. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 446 that
was affirmed without written opinion by the Fourth Circuit. 3 2 The two remaining opinions of the Northern District of California are examined below.
The earliest cases permitting duty-of-fair-representation suits under the
Civil Service Reform Act to be brought in federal court were the decisions of
the district court in Karahalios I and Karahalios II. 73 Karahalios was a
Greek teacher at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. He
was promoted to a position once held by another instructor who had been
demoted due to the elimination of the job. When Karahalios was placed in
the reopened position, the former employee challenged the appointment
through collective bargaining arbitration and was eventually awarded the
position. 4 Throughout the grievance proceedings, neither the union nor the

Ford, Heftel, Meyers, Schroeder, Solarz, and Wilson); id. at 390 (supplementary view of Rep.
Solarz); 124 CONG. REC. H9637 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay); id. at H9645
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ford); id. at H9648 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Ford).
370. See Aaron, supra note 10.
371. See supra notes 26-29 and 296-300 and accompanying text.
372. Naylor v. AFGE, Local 446, 580 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd without written
opinion, 727 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1984).
373. Karahalios1, 534 F. Supp. 1202; Karahalios II, 544 F. Supp. 77.
374. KarahaliosI, 534 F. Supp. at 1204.
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employer notified plaintiff of the controversy. 375 After Karahalios was
replaced, the union refused to process his grievance, stating it would conflict
with the arguments previously made in the other arbitration.

76

The union

opposed further arbitration brought inand the federal agency successfully
77
dividually by Karahalios.

Karahalios then filed unfair labor practice charges against the union and
his employer with the Federal Labor Relations Authority. 378 The Regional
Director refused to issue a complaint and the General Counsel affirmed that
refusal with respect to the employer. 379 The General Counsel reversed as to
the union and directed the Regional Director to issue a complaint or to
settle.380 The union settled the unfair labor practice complaint with the FLRA
without giving any individual relief to Karahalios. 381 Specifically, the settlement provided merely that the union would agree to notify all members that
in the future it would not represent more than one individual seeking the
same job.38 2 Reconsideration of the decisions by the General Counsel 38was
district court. 3

denied. Consequently, Karahalios brought suit in federal
In KarahaliosI the court allowed Karahalios to maintain the duty-of-fairrepresentation complaint against the union, but dismissed with leave to
amend the complaint against the government.3 81

The case against the

of the government to be
employer was said to rest, if at all, upon the consent
385
sued for contract actions via the Tucker Act.

In Karahalios II the court held that plaintiff had exceeded the $10,000
maximum amount in controversy requirement of the Tucker Act,386 and
therefore the proper forum under the Tucker Act was the United States
also reaffirmed its earlier decision on the comCourt of Claims. 387 The 3court
88
plaint against the union.

The facts of KarahaliosI and 11 illustrate the tensions inherent in a labor
relations system that protects individual rights through membership in a
group. 389 The potential for individual rights being subordinated by the collec375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1208-09.
385. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982); Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1209.
386. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982); KarahaliosII, 544 F. Supp. at 78.
387. KarahaliosII, 544 F. Supp. at 79-80.
388. Id. at 79. Whether jurisdiction is proper under the Tucker Act or under the general
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, cannot be resolved without an in-depth analysis of
whether federal employment rights are contractual in nature. KarahaliosI, 534 F. Supp. at 1209.
That complex question is beyond the scope of this article. The Karahalioscases are the only decisions that arguably discuss duty-of-fair-representation suits through Tucker Act jurisdiction.
389. Patternmakers League of North Am. v. NLRB, 105 S.Ct. 3064 (1985) (right of union
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tive was a major factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca,39 and was
used in the district court in Karahaliosto support its jurisdiction over plaintiff's duty-of-fair-representation suit.39 ' Further, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority in Karahalios settled the unfair labor practice complaint without
providing Karahalios individual relief. Thus, it is clear that in such an administrative procedure the individual charging party plays a secondary role to
that of the agency. 392 In Karahalios the FLRA was more concerned with

preventing future abuses by the union than with obtaining individual relief
for Karahalios. 313 Thus, the institutional role of the administrative agency
may lead to a predominant concern with the questions of broad labor policy
to the detriment of the rights of individual employees. 39
If the decisons in Karahalioscan be criticized, it is in the manner in which
the court distinguishes past precedent on the issue of federal court jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The court distinguished Columbia
Power Trades,391 United States v. PA TCO,396 NFFE,'397 and Clark v. Mark"8

on the basis that they all involved injunctive relief, whereas in Karahaliosthe
plaintiff sought damages for breach of the duty of fair representation. 9
Logically, this distinction would seem to have little import.
In duty-of-fair-representation suits, there is no reason to distinguish
between damage actions and injunctive relief. In the private sector,
both the National Labor Relations Board and the courts have granted
both legal' 0° and equitable'" remedies for duty-of-fair-representation
members to resign during a strike); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (union
member's right to limit union's use of agency shop fees); Emporium-Capwell Co. v. Western
Add'n Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (minority union member's right to assert grievances
outside the union process); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (union right
to fine member.; for crossing picket lines); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)
(employees' rights to negotiate individual contracts with employer). See generally Wellington,
Union Democracy andFairRepresentation:FederalResponsibility in aFederal System, 67 YALE
L.J. 1327 (1958); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049
(1951).

390. 386 U.S. at 182-83.
391. Karahalios I, 534 F. Supp. at 1207-08; Karahalios 11, 544 F. Supp. at 79, 81.
392. See also Turgeon, 677 F.2d 937.
393. Karahalios 1,534 F. Supp. at 1208.
394. Id. at 1207. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182-83.
395. 671 F.2d 325 (writ of mandamus to compel enforcement of arbitration award).
396. 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (injunction to stop unlawful
strike).
397. 493 F. Supp. 675 (scope of collective bargaining obligation).
398. 590 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
399. Karahalios I1,
544 F. Supp. at 79.
400. See, e.g., Figeroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281
(Ist
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. De Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956) (RLA case);
Automobile Workers Local 417 (Falcon Indus.), 245 N.L.R.B. 527 (1979); IBEW Local 2088
(Federal Elec. Corp.), 218 N.L.R.B. 396 (1975).
401. See, e.g., Vaca, 386 U.S. 171; Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281;
Local 12, Rubber Workers (Business League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), aff'd, 368
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breaches.4"2 There is simply no support either in duty-of-fair-representation
doctrine or in the legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act for such
a limitation on remedies in the federal sector.
Conclusion
In enacting the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress consciously adopted
the National Labor Relations Act and private sector labor law as the model
for federal sector employee-management relations. While some important
concessions were made to accommodate concerns unique to public sector employment, the Civil Service Reform Act specifically granted labor organizations and the collective bargaining process an increased role in the federal
workplace. This choice evidenced a congressional policy shift away from ensuring employee rights through the traditional civil service administrative
system and toward protecting those rights by union representation.
In so doing, Congress not only provided the benefits of that system but its
drawbacks. Both the National Labor Relations Act and the Civil Service
Reform Act are premised on a collective bargaining scheme based upon majority rule. Such a scheme necessarily carries with it a risk of the subordination of individual employee rights to those of the collective. This result is a
structural consequence of the labor laws. Indeed, potential "tyranny of the
40 3
majority" is endemic to all democratic institutions.
In private sector labor relations, the United States Supreme Court has
noted the parallels between a system of representative government and a
union's majority status. 04 That analogy provided the foundation for the imposition of the duty of fair representation, which has served as a guard
against overreaching by the majority against a minority rendered powerless
by the structure of the collective bargaining process.40 5 As public sector labor
relations in the Civil Service Reform Act approach the private model, this
federal sponsorship of collective bargaining and union majority rule imposes
an obligation on government to protect the individual through the federal
court cognizance of duty-of-fair-representation suits. 4 06

F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Chemical Workers Local 190 (FMC
Corp.), 251 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1980).
402. Even the Norris-LaGuardia Act, (47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(1982)), which denied federal court jurisdiction t6 issue injunctions in labor disputes, has been
held not to prevent equitable relief in duty-of-fair-representation suits. Steele, 323 U.S. at
207-08; Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 213-14; Sindicato de TrabajadoresPackinghouse, 425 F.2d at 291.
403. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. XV, 241-54 (1966) (1st ed. 1835). See
generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 and 51 (J. Madison); I A. DETocQuEVILLE, supra, at 241-54;
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 1-14 (1947); C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 236-37
(1958); Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 405-08
(1975).
404. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202.
405. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182.
406. See Wellington, supra note 389, at 1339.
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Nothing in the policies or history of the Civil Service Reform Act contradicts this conclusion. To the contrary, the congressional assumptions
underlying the Act demand it. Therefore, the arguments of the Eleventh Circuit in Warren and other courts denying federal subject matter jurisdiction
over duty-of-fair-representation suits are erroneous. Federal government
employees are in need of, and entitled to, the same protection as their private
sector counterparts.
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